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Abstract
In this paper I show, using both empirical and theoretical analysis, that changes in
monetary policy in one country can have important effects on other economies. My
new empirical evidence shows that changes in the monetary policy behaviour of the
Fed since the start of the Euro, well captured by a Markov-switching Taylor rule, have
had significant effects on the behaviour of inflation and output in the Eurozone even
though ECB’s monetary policy is found to be fairly stable. Using a two-country DSGE
model, I examine this case theoretically; monetary policy in one of the countries (labelled
foreign) switches regimes according to a Markov-switching process and this has non-
negligible effects in the other (home) country. Switching by the foreign central bank
renders commitment to a time invariant interest rate rule suboptimal for the home central
bank. This is because home agents expectations change as foreign monetary policy
changes which affects the dynamics of home inflation and output. Optimal policy in the
home country instead reacts to the regime of the foreign monetary policy and so implies
a time-varying reaction of the home Central Bank. Following this time-varying optimal
policy at home eliminates the effects in the home country of foreign regime shifts, and
also reduces dramatically the effects in the foreign country. Therefore, changes in foreign
monetary regimes should not be neglected in considering monetary policy at home.
Keywords: Markov-switching DSGE, Optimal monetary policy, Dynamic programming,
SVAR, real-time data.
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1 Introduction
Regime changes in the conduct of monetary policy have been documented largely over the last ten
years. They refer to changes in the way a central bank reacts to the key macroeconomic variables,
i.e. inflation and output. An example of this kind of change in monetary policy is that of the
US. In particular, Clarida et al. (2001), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni
(2006) show that the reaction of the Fed towards inflation fluctuations until the late ’70s was less
aggressive compared to that from the early ’80s onwards. As a result many authors attribute high
inflation volatility in the US during the ’70s to the way the Fed was reacting over that period to
inflation fluctuations.1 Moreover, according to these authors, changes in monetary policy are the
main reason for the changes in the impulse responses of inflation and output. Even though there
is ample empirical and theoretical evidence regarding the effects of changes in monetary policy in
a closed economy setup, there is very little evidence about the international effects.
In this paper I show, both empirically and theoretically, that changes in monetary policy in
one country have important effects on other economies. In the empirical analysis, I find that the
monetary policy of the US has changed since the start of the Euro. This change affected the
dynamics of inflation and output in the Eurozone significantly. However, the monetary policy
of the ECB is found to be fairly stable. In the theoretical analysis, I show that changes in the
monetary policy of one country (labelled foreign) have non-neglible effects on the dynamics of the
key macroeconomic variables in the other (home) country. This result is further enhanced as long
as the home country does not take into account changes in foreign monetary policy. However, both
economies benefit when the home central bank reacts optimally to foreign monetary policy regime
shifts.
A popular way of modelling regime changes in monetary policy is by assuming that the interest
rate rule coefficients change according to a Markov switching process. Using this approach Davig
and Leeper (2007), Liu et al. (2008, 2009), Farmer et al. (2011) and Bekaert et al. (2011) construct
closed economy DSGE models in order to analyze the effects of regime shifts in monetary policy
on inflation and output.2 These papers conclude that the expectation of a future regime shift in
1There is a huge literature over the causes of a change in inflation volatility in the US. Some authors, such as Stock and Watson
(2003), attribute that change to different shock sizes, rather than to changes in the way monetary policy was conducted .
2In all of these papers the theoretical analysis is motivated by the empirical estimates about the way monetary policy was conducted
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monetary policy has significant effects on inflation and output today. Those effects can be either
stabilizing or destabilizing depending on what is the expected future policy.
The existing literature on Markov-switching DSGE models, though, is restricted to a closed
economy framework. As a result, so far, the cross country effects of regime shifts in monetary policy
have not been analyzed. Therefore, it is important that we have an open economy framework, so
that to analyze the effects in one country of a change in monetary policy of another country.
The first contribution of the paper is to provide empirical evidence regarding the international
effects of changes in monetary policy. I estimate a SVAR model for the US and the Eurozone using
real time monthly data spanning from 1999 through 2010. The empirical model includes seven
variables, namely inflation, output gap and the nominal interest rate for both the Eurozone and
the US, as well as the real exchange rate. I perform parameter stability tests using the Andrews
sup-Wald test, as in Boivin and Giannoni (2002) and the Andrews-Ploberger test.3 Both tests
find that there have been statistically significant changes in the coefficients in the US interest
rate equation. This implies that there has been a change in the systematic behaviour of the Fed.
However, coefficients in the Eurozone interest rate equation are stable throughout the sample. The
Andrews-Ploberger test identifies the break date in June 2004. Therefore, I split the sample into
two sub-samples, namely before and after that date. The impulse response analysis shows that the
responses of inflation and output gap in the Eurozone are completely different in the two samples.
But what drives the changes in the impulse responses of inflation and output in the Eurozone?
In order to answer that question, I perform a countrefactual analysis in the VAR model. I find
that the main reason for the change in the impulse responses of those variables was the change in
the US monetary policy. I examine also whether changes in the conditions in the Euro area can
account for that. I find that their contribution at causing changes in the impulse responses is tiny.
Given the weakness of the SVAR model in uncovering a Taylor rule, a last step in the empirical
analysis is to explore whether there have been indeed changes in Fed’s contemporaneous reaction
to inflation and output gap fluctuations. For this reason I estimate a Taylor rule for the US whose
coefficients change over time according to a Markov-switching process. The estimated rule findings
validate that the monetary policy of the Fed has changed since the start of the Euro and are in
in the US from 1970 until recently.
3I use the Andrews-Ploberger test because of its virtue of identifying the break date.
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line with the stability tests from the SVAR model. The rule changes state only once. Notably,
the regime change date is very close to the break date identified by the Andrews-Ploberger test in
the US interest rate equation. Keeping those findings in mind, I proceed to the construction of a
two-country DSGE model.
The theoretical model is similar to that of Benigno and Benigno (2001) and Benigno (2004). I
extend their approach by allowing the coefficients in the foreign interest rate rule only to change
according to a Markov-switching process. The home country instead adopts a time-invariant
Taylor rule with some interest rate smoothing. I show that even though the home monetary policy
is constantly (and with a constant coefficient) hawkish4, home inflation exhibits changes in its
volatility over time. Specifically, if there is a positive probability that foreign monetary policy
will be dovish5 in the future, then not only foreign inflation will be more volatile, but also home
inflation. This is because both home and foreign agents incorporate this probability in their future
inflation expectations.6 The increase in the volatility of home inflation in this case comes from the
home agents expectation of an increasing volatility in the real exchange rate and relative prices.
Therefore, commitment to a regime independent interest rate rule proves not to be enough to
stabilize the home economy.
Hence, as a next step, I examine the optimal policy of the home country. I solve the optimal
policy problem of the home central bank conditional on foreign monetary policy switching regimes
over time. I extend Soderlind’s (1998) algorithm for solving optimal policy problems in linear
rational expectations models to a Markov-switching framework. I show that a time invariant
interest rate rule is suboptimal for the home country. The home central bank must be always
hawkish. How much hawkish the home central bank should be, depends on the regime which
the foreign monetary policy lies in. More specifically, I find that as the probability that the
foreign central bank becomes dovish rises, the home central bank should increase the coefficient
on inflation further. The opposite holds as the probability that the foreign central bank becomes
hawkish increases. The intuition behind this result is that when home agents expect that foreign
monetary policy will become dovish, they anticipate an increase in the volatility of home inflation.
4Throughout the paper hawkish refers to the case where the coefficient on inflation in the interest rate rule is greater than one. In
the literature, this implies that the central bank cares a lot about inflation stabilization.
5Throughout the paper dovish refers to the case where the coefficient on inflation in the interest rate rule is less than one. In the
literature, this implies that the central bank is more tolerant of inflation fluctuations.
6Throughout the paper I assume that the probability of a regime switch is the same for both home and foreign agents.
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Hence, the home central bank must react in such a way so that to offset this effect on home agents
expectations. And this, as I show, is achieved by increasing the coefficient on home inflation in the
home interest rate rule. Additionally, the coefficient on output gap must increase as well, as the
foreign monetary policy becomes dovish. This means that when the foreign country changes its
policy, then the home must adjust (change) its policy appropriately. Regime switching monetary
policy proves to be Pareto superior for the home country. More importantly, I show that when the
home central bank reacts optimally to changes in foreign monetary policy, the effects of changes
in the latter are eliminated in the home country, and reduced dramatically in the foreign.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 a SVAR model is estimated using real time
data for the Eurozone and the US, in order to motivate the theoretical model. In section 3 a
two country DSGE model is constructed, allowing for regime switching in monetary policy of the
foreign country. In section 4, I describe how Markov switching monetary policy is introduced into
the model. In section 5, the model is presented in its loglinear form. In section 6 the solution
technique of the Markov-Switching DSGE (MSDSGE) is described. In section 7 the model is
calibrated and simulated. In section 8 the optimal policy problem of the home central bank is
solved, in order to find what the optimal reaction of the latter should be, conditional on foreign
monetary policy switching regimes. Section 9 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
2.1 A SVAR model for the Eurozone and the US
In this section I present a structural VAR model for the Eurozone and the US.
The SVAR model consists of seven variables, namely output gap, inflation rate and nominal
interest rates in the Eurozone and the US, and the real exchange rate. Such a model may lead to
better policy implications because the regions under consideration are close trade partners and,
hence, it is likely that changes or shocks in the monetary policy of one region have important effect
on the other. The SVAR model has the following form.
A0Xt = Γ0 + Σpi=1ΓiXt−i + ut (1)
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where A0 is nonsingular, while the variance-covariance matrix of the fundamental disturbances
Σu = E(ut, u
′
t) is assumed to be diagonal. The short-run restrictions imposed allow for contempo-
raneous effects of the CPI rate and the output gap on the policy rate in each region. Therefore,
the complete representation of the SVAR model is summarized as follows.

1 a12 0 a14 0 a16 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
a31 a32 1 0 0 0 0
a41 0 0 1 a45 0 0
0 a52 0 a54 1 a56 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 a75 a76 1


CPIEuro
GapEuro
iEuro
RER
CPIUS
GapUS
iUS

t
=
=

γ10
γ20
γ30
γ40
γ50
γ60
γ70

+

γ11 γ12 γ13 γ14 γ15 γ16 γ17
γ21 γ22 γ23 γ24 γ25 γ26 γ27
γ31 γ32 γ33 γ34 γ35 γ36 γ37
γ41 γ42 γ43 γ44 γ45 γ46 γ47
γ51 γ52 γ53 γ54 γ55 γ56 γ57
γ61 γ62 γ63 γ64 γ65 γ66 γ67
γ71 γ72 γ73 γ74 γ75 γ76 γ77


CPIEuro
GapEuro
iEuro
RER
CPIUS
GapUS
iUS

t−1
+

u1,t
u2,t
u3,t
u4,t
u5,t
u6,t
u7,t

The reduced form of the VAR model is specified as
Xt = A−10 Γ0 + A−10 Σ
p
i=1ΓiXt−i + εt
where εt = A−10 ut are the reduced form errors with a variance-covariance matrix Σε = E(εt, ε
′
t) =
A−10 E(ut, u
′
t)A−10 = A−10 ΣuA−1
′
0 .
The target in this section is to ascertain whether there have been changes in the way monetary
policy was conducted until today by both the ECB and the Fed. Therefore, for each equation of the
SVAR model, the stability of its the coefficients is tested.7 The first test the Andrews sup-Wald
test. The second is the Andrews-Ploberger test.8 The former has the virtue that it has power
against various alternatives, as far as the process of the structural parameters is concerned. The
7Evidence of parameter instability in monetary VAR models is mixed. Boivin and Giannoni (2002), Bernanke, Gertler and Watson
(1997) and Boivin (2005) find evidence of parameter instability, while Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) find the opposite.
8Note that the heteroskedasticity robust version of both tests was used.
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latter is able to identify the timing of the break, if there is one. If there is evidence of parameter
instability, then the impulse responses computed using the model estimated for the whole sample
are no longer valid. Therefore, if this is the case, I will split the sample in smaller sub-samples,
depending on the timing of the break, estimated by the Andrews-Ploeberger test.
Given that some authors have argued in favour of changes in the size of shocks hitting the
economy, rather than changes in the structural parameters, being the reason for changes in the
transmission of monetary policy, heteroskedasticity tests in the estimated residuals are also per-
formed. For each equation specific estimated residual the LM test for ARCH effects is used.
2.2 Data
Real-time monthly data9 were gathered from the ECB statistical warehouse and the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia. The dataset spans from 1999:1 though 2010:6. GDP is proxied by total
industrial production. CPI for each region is used as the inflation rate. As far as the policy rates
are concerned, the Federal Funds rate for the US and the interbank overnight rate for the Eurozone
are used. Finally, the nominal exchange rate is measured by the end of period euro-dollar rate.
2.3 Empirical results
2.3.1 Stability and heteroskedasticity tests
Prior to the estimation of the SVAR model10, I perform stability tests in each equation’s coefficients
in the reduced form VAR model. At table 1 below the p− values from both tests are reported11.
Stability tests show that at 1% significance level, the systematic behaviour of the Fed has changed
over the sample considered. Four out of seven coefficients in the equation for the Fed Funds rate
have changed over time. On the other hand, monetary policy in the Eurozone has not changed at
1% significance level. At 5% significance level, though, the coefficients on lagged foreign inflation
and the real exchange rate appear to have changed. As for the output gap in the Eurozone, it
9For the importance of using real-time data for monetary policy prescriptions see Orphanides (2003) and the references therein.
10The lag length of the VAR model was chosen based on the AIC and the BIC criterion. Both criteria showed that 2 lags is optimal.
11I report p − values obtained only from the Andrews-Ploberger test in order to save space. The results from the Andrews-Quandt
test lead to the same conclusions.
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is stable. I derive the same result for CPI in the US. On the other hand the coefficients in the
Eurozone CPI and the US output gap equations are subject to breaks at 5 %significance levels.
Although, it is easy to interpret breaks in the coefficients in the interest rate equations as changes
in the way monetary policy is conducted, breaks in the CPI and the output gap equations are less
easy to interpret.
Table 1: Stability Tests on Reduced-form VAR coefficients
Regressors
Dep. vrb CPIEuro GapEuro iEuro RER CPIUS GapUS iUS
CPIEuro 0.0181* 0.9491 0.0189* 0.0415* 0.0174* 0.4007 0.0353
GapEuro 0.7225 0.2944 0.7338 0.7030 0.7407 0.3018 0.6947
iEuro 0.0508 0.6871 0.1231 0.0432* 0.0497* 0.5500 0.0825
RER 0.0008** 0.5122 0.0002** 0.0015** 0.0007** 0.7031 0.0047*
CPIUS 0.5558 0.4223 0.2338 0.6056 0.5608 0.4859 0.1903
GapUS 0.0112* 0.0561 0.0132* 0.0429* 0.0112* 0.1491 0.0388*
iUS 0.0025** 0.6122 0.0000** 0.0030** 0.0026** 0.2339 0.1093
Notes: p− values reported. ** Significant at 1% s.l., * Significant at 5% s.l.
As regards Eurozone CPI, it is found that the coefficients on the lagged Eurozone and US CPI
rates are subject to breaks. This could be attributed to changes in the degree of openness in the
Eurozone, or home bias. Taking into account the structure of a hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips
curve, the break in the coefficient on lagged interest rate in the Eurozone CPI equation , could be
due to either a change in the frequency of price adjustments, or a change in the degree of backward
lookingness in price setting behaviour, or a change in the degree of risk aversion, or change in the
degree of habits in consumption, or a combination of all the above. Finally, the changes in the
coefficients on lagged Eurozone CPI rate, on lagged Eurozone interest rate, on lagged real exchange
rate, on lagged US CPI rate and on lagged US interest rate in the US output gap equation could
be attributed to changes in the degree of openness of the US economy, the degree of risk aversion,
the degree of endogenous persistence in output, or to a combination of those three factors. I keep,
however, the fact that US monetary policy is found to have changed which is the main motivation
of this paper.
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Finally, the Andrews-Ploberger test showed that the break in the US interest rate equation
coefficients took place in June 2004.12 I use this estimate to split the initial sample into two
sub-samples when I will be doing the impulse response analysis in the next section.
The last test performed was on the variance of the estimated equation specific residuals. As
already mentioned, I test for this using the LM test for ARCH effects. The results are shown at
table 2. Results at table 2 show that at 5% significance level only the variance of the residuals
from the Eurozone interest rate equation has changed over time.
Table 2: Heteroskedacticity tests
p− values
CPIEuro 0.6088
GapEuro 0.1550
iEuro 0.0105
RER 0.5734
CPIUS 0.2365
GapUS 0.4856
iUS 0.4261
2.3.2 Impulse responses
In this section the impulses responses are computed. I split the initial sample into two sub-samples,
according the results from the Andrews-Ploberger test. Namely, until and after June 2004.13 The
impulse responses of the variables are computed for each sub-sample. At figure 1 below I present
the responses of CPI in the Eurozone following a contractionary monetary policy shock, a positive
cost-push shock, a positive demand shock and a positive RER shock in both the Eurozone and the
US.
The impulse responses are different in the two samples. In particular, CPI inflation is more
volatile and persistent in the second sample for all kinds of shocks considered14. Moreover, the sign
12Ben Bernanke in his speech at the annual meeting of the American economic association in 2010 mentions that the FOMC increased
its target for the federal funds rate in June 2004.
13From now on I will refer to the sample spanning from 1999:1 to 2004:6 as Sample 1. Sample 2 will represent the sample spanning
from 2004:7 to 2010:6.
14Impulse responses of the output gap lead to the same conclusion. The latter is less volatile and persistent after all kinds of shocks,
in the first sample.
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of the initial impact seems to change as well, following a monetary policy shock in the Eurozone
and the US. For example, CPI initially jumps in sample 1, after a monetary policy shock in the
Eurozone. On the contrary, it falls in sample 2.
Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Eurozone CPI to alternative shocks
Sample 1: 1999:1 - 2004:6
Sample 2: 2004:7 - 2010:6
Notes: Blue lines: 95% posterior confidence interval. Demand: demand shock in the Eurozone. Supply: supply
shock in the Eurozone. RER: real exchange rate shock. MP-Euro: monetary policy shock in the Eurozone. MP-US:
monetary policy shock in the US. Demand-US: demand shock in the US. Supply-US: supply shock in the US.
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Counterfactual Analysis with the SVAR
In the previous section, I showed that the responses of Eurozone CPI to monetary policy shocks has
changed over time. Given that stability tests suggest that coefficients in equations other than that
of the US interest rate have changed as well, it may be that the changes in the impulse responses
are due to changes in the coefficients in the nonpolicy part of the VAR rather than the policy one.
For this reason, I now investigate the source of the change in the impulse responses of inflation
and output in both countries. I perform a counterfactual exercise on the structural VAR model. I
implement two experiments. At the first, I am trying to figure out whether the observed changes
in the impulse responses are explained by the change in the US monetary policy, keeping all other
coefficients constant. At the second, I allow only for the coefficients in the US output gap and the
Eurozone CPI equation to change. This allows me to explore the extent to which the differences
in the impulse responses can be attributed to changes in the coefficients in the nonpolicy block of
the SVAR model, rather than the policy one.
To address the above two questions, let T characterize US monetary policy, K characterize
Eurozone CPI and US GDP and N characterize the remaining part of the economy. In particular,
TS is the set of the estimated parameters of the US interest rate equation, KS is the set of the esti-
mated parameters in the Eurozone CPI and US GDP equation and NS is the set of the estimated
parameters of the remaining part of the VAR. Subscript S refers to the period within which those
parameters have been estimated. For instance a combination (Tpre−2004:6, Kpre−2004:6, Npre−2004:6)
denotes the set of all the estimated parameters in the Sample 1. This set of parameters charac-
terizes completely the impulse response functions computed for that sample. On the other hand a
combination (Tpost−2004:6, Kpost−2004:6, Npost−2004:6) denotes the set of all the estimated parameters
in Sample 2.
In order to answer the first question (i.e. whether the change in the impulse responses is due
to a change in the US monetary policy) I will use (Tpost−2004:6, Kpre−2004:6, Npre−2004:6). That
is, keeping all other coefficients fixed and allowing only the coefficients in the US interest rate
equation to change, I will compute the new impulse response functions. The same strategy will be
followed in order to answer the second question. Since, now, the focus is on the effect of changes in
the parameters in the Eurozone CPI and the US GDP equations, I will keep all other coefficients
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fixed. In particular, the new impulse response functions are obtained using the combination
(Tpre−2004:6, Kpost−2004:6, Npre−2004:6). Table 3 gives a picture of the two experiments. In the left
column, I indicate the impulse response functions that will be used in each experiment. In the
right column I refer to the coefficients used for the computation of each impulse response function.
Table 3: Counterfactual Analysis
Experiment 1: Changes only in US interest rate equation coefficients
Impulse Response Set of coefficients used
Sample 1 (Tpre−2004:6, Kpre−2004:6, Npre−2004:6)
Counterfactual (Tpost−2004:6, Kpre−2004:6, Npre−2004:6)
Sample 2 (Tpost−2004:6, Kpost−2004:6, Npost−2004:6)
Experiment 2: Changes only in US GDP and Euro CPI equation coefficients
Impulse Response Set of coefficients used
Sample 1 (Tpre−2004:6, Kpre−2004:6, Npre−2004:6)
Counterfactual (Tpre−2004:6, Kpost−2004:6, Npre−2004:6)
Sample 2 (Tpost−2004:6, Kpost−2004:6, Npost−2004:6)
The impulse responses from experiments 1 and 2 are illustrated in panel (a) and (b) in figure
2. The impulse response functions in panel (a) in figure 2 show that changes in the US interest
rate coefficients account more for the change in the impulse responses in the Sample 1. In fact,
the blue dashed line (counterfactual impulse response) moves close to the red dotted line, which
is the impulse response function in Sample 2.
On the other hand, as shown in panel (b), when only the coefficients in the US output gap and
the Eurozone CPI equations change, the impulse response functions in Sample 1 do not seem to
be affected significantly. The blue dashed line, now, moves very close to the black solid line in
all cases. Therefore, the two experiments show that it is indeed the change in the US systematic
reaction that caused the change in the impulse response functions of inflation and output gap in
the Eurozone.15
15Note that the results are the same for US CPI inflation and the output gaps of both countries. I do not present them here, in order
to save space.
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Figure 2: VAR Counterfactual Exercise
Panel (a): Experiment 1 - Changes only in US interest rate equation coefficients
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Panel (b): Experiment 2 - Changes only in US GDP and Euro CPI equation coefficients
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2.3.3 Robustness checks
In order to check the sensitivity of the results found so far, various robustness exercises are
implemented. The first one considers alternative measures for the output gap. The procedure
followed is similar to that in CGG (2000). In particular, instead of using the hp-filter, the output
gap was measured as the deviation of log industrial output from a fitted quadratic function of time.
The results do not differ significantly.16 Both the AIC and the BIC information criteria show that
two is the optimal choice of lags in the VAR model. The parameter stability tests do not differ
significantly from those reported at table 1 above. The Andrews-Ploberger test locates a break in
the parameters in the Federal Funds rate equation in June 2004, as was the case when the hp-filter
was used. However, what seems to change now is the coefficients only on the lags of the Euro-rate
at 1% significance level. The coefficients on the rest the parameters remain unchanged.17 The LM
test for ARCH effects provides the same results as before. That is, only the the variance of the
errors in the Euro-rate equation changes at 1% significance level. Finally, the impulse responses
lead to the same conclusion as above. Both the CPI and the output gap in the Eurozone responses
are different in the two sub-samples.
As a second exercise, a more parsimonious SVAR model was constructed. Given that the dataset
is small, it is likely that the impulse responses may not be accurate, the higher the number of the
free parameters to be estimated in matrix A in (1). Therefore, a new SVAR model was estimated
allowing for a31, a32, a75, a76 to be the only free parameters to be estimated. The key results, found
so far, do not change. The impulse responses of the CPI and the the output gap in the Eurozone
show that both are more volatile and persistent in sample 2.18
Moreover, the importance of additional targets in the interest rate rule of both central banks
was tested. That is, it was assumed that the each of rest the variables in the system has a
contemporaneous effect on the interest rate of each region. At first, the strategy followed was to
16I do not show the results of the robustness exercise here, in order to save space.
17Remember that when the hp − filter was used, the Andrews-Ploberger test found that the coefficients on the US and the Euro
CPI, the Eurozone output gap and the real exchange rate change, as well, apart from those on the lags of the Euro-rate.
18Setting a12 = a16 = a52 = a56 = a75 = a76 = 0 has negligible effects on the impulse responses. Setting, though, a14 = a54 = 0
has non-neglible effects on the impulse responses. That is, allowing for a contemporaneous effect of real exchange rate shocks on the
CPI in either country changes the behavior of both the output gap and inflation. In the first subsample, the Eurozone output gap is
less volatile after a shock to the RER than when a14, a54 6= 0. The same holds for the Eurozone CPI. In the second subsample, the
Eurozone CPI is much less volatile after a shock to the RER. Following a demand shock, though, the latter is more volatile. The output
gap in the Eurozone is more volatile after a RER shock whenver a14 = a54 = 0. However, as regards the rest of the shocks, the effects
of not allowing for contermporaneous effects of RER shocks to the CPI are negligible. Finally, note that still the main conclusion does
not change. All variables are more volatile in the secong subsample.
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test the importance of each of the parameters in matrix A individually, so that to avoid the cost of
loosing degrees of freedom. Then, the case where both banks reacting to foreign variables or the
RER, jointly, was considered. In this case, both central banks achieve a better control of inflation
but only in sample 1. It is enough that only one of the two banks adopts a target for the real
exchange rate. However, the opposite holds in sample 2, where RER targeting does worse than
the initial specification in matrix A0. Reacting to foreign inflation yields non-neglible gains19 to
both regions. But this holds only for sample 1. Moreover, the sign of the initial responses of some
variables, after some shocks, seems to be reversed. When both banks react to the foreign interest
rate, there are significant gains regarding inflation fluctuations, in sample 1, especially after a
monetary policy shock in the Eurozone. On the contrary, this no longer holds in sample 2 where
reacting to the foreign rate seems not preferable. Finally, foreign output gap targeting allows for
lower inflation and output fluctuations in both regions, regardless of the sample.
The possibility, though, of both central banks targeting at the same time foreign variables
and/or the real exchange rate was also considered. The differences with the initial results are
negligible.
2.3.4 A Markov switching interest rate rule for the US
Taking into account the stability test results of section 2.4.1 and given the weakness of the
SVAR models in uncovering a Taylor rule, I now estimate a Markov-switching interest rate rule
for the US. This allows me to explore whether there were indeed changes in the reaction of the
Fed against inflation and output gap fluctuations. The rule is specified as
it = α0(st) + αpi(st)pit + αx(st)xt + εt (2)
where pit is inflation and xt is the output gap. st indicates the monetary policy regime and follows
a two-state Markov chain. The sample I use is the same as that used for the estimation of the
structural VAR model above. Table 4 reports the parameter estimates.
19By gains, I mean lower inflation and output gap fluctuations.
15
Table 4: Monetary policy rule estimates
States Hawkish Dovish
st = 1 st = 2
αpi 1.1621 (0.00) 0.3298 (0.05)
αx 1.5640 (0.01) 0.9499 (0.02)
σε 0.555436 0.735924
Log likelihood value = -188.5974. P-values in parentheses
the estimated transition matrix is as follows:
P =
 0.99 0.01
0.01 0.99
 (3)
Figure 3 below plots the estimated transition probabilities for each regime.
Figure 3: Smoothed States Probabilities
Notes: Blue solid line: Dovish (State 2). Green dashed line: Hawkish (State 1).
The estimated Markov-switching Taylor rule shows that the Fed started being hawkish since the
start of the Euro and then switched to be more reluctant to inflation fluctuations from 2005
onwards. The regime change date is very close to what stability tests in section 2.3.1 suggest
about the coefficients in the US interest rate equation. Note that the SVAR model specified
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cannot uncover a Taylor rule. However, the Markov-switching specification in this section does.
Moreover, it ensures that there was indeed a change in the coefficients in the interest rate rule of
the Fed throughout the sample considered.
2.3.5 Key Results
From the empirical analysis above, I keep the following key messages. The first is that there were
changes in US monetary policy since the adoption of the common currency in Europe which have
affected the bahaviour of key macroeconomic variables not only in the US, but also in the Eurozone.
Moreover, this change in US monetary policy has affected the way macroeconomic aggregates react
to various kinds of domestic and foreign shocks. Therefore, changes in the way monetary policy
is conducted in the foreign country (US) have important implications on the behaviour of the
home country (Eurozone) macroeconomic variables, even though domestic monetary policy does
not change. The degree of openness and, hence, terms of trade effects are likely to be one of
the main driving forces for this result. The second is that, there were changes in the behavior of
the private sector, as well. The counterfactual analysis, though, shows that their effect is small
at changing the behavior of inflation and output in either region. Finally, a markov-switching
interest rate rule for the US is in line with the stability tests in the SVAR model and provides
evidence in favour of changes in the coefficients on inflation and output gap. Keeping those facts
I proceed to the construction of a two country DSGE model, in order to explore theoretically
what are the international effects of regime changes in foreign monetary policy. I then solve for
the optimal policy problem of the home Central Bank, conditional on foreign monetary policy
switching regimes over time.
3 The model
3.1 Households
In this section, I specify the structure of the baseline, two country stochastic general equilibrium
model. Each country is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived and identical households in
the interval [0, 1]. Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.
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Persistence has been found to be an important feature of output in Eurozone and the US.20
For this reason I introduce endogenous persistence in consumption by assuming that there are
two kinds of households as in Amato and Laubach (2003). Let ψ denote the probability that the
household is able to choose its consumption optimally, and which is independent of the household’s
history. Therefore, by the law of large numbers, in each period a fraction ψ of households will
reoptimise, whereas the remaining fraction 1− ψ will not. The latter will choose its consumption
in period t according to the following rule of thumb
CRt = Ct−1 (4)
where Ct denotes aggregate per capita consumption in period t. The remaining 1−ψ of households
choose COt so as to maximize their utility. Thus, per capita consumption in period t is given by
Ct = ψCOt + (1− ψ)CRt (5)
As in Laubach and Amato, this modification to the consumer’s problem is based on the assumption
that it is costly to reoptimise every period21. The households who choose consumption optimally
choose COt to maximize their utility function. They derive utility from consumption and disutility
from labor supply. The utility function, thus, is specified as
Ut = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
(Cs)1−σ
1− σ −
(Ls)1+γ
1 + γ
]
(6)
where σ is the degree of relative risk aversion.
Home agents consume home and foreign goods. Therefore, per capita consumption Ct is a com-
posite consumption index described as
20Smets and Wouters (2005), Sahuc and Smets (2008) and Adjemian et al. (2008) using Bayesian techniques to estimate DSGE
models for the Eurozone and the US find that output persistence in both regions is high.
21Amato and Laubach note that Rule (4) has the important feature that rule-of-thumb consumers learn from optimizing households
with one period delay. Hence, although Rule (4) is not optimal, it has three important properties. First agents are not required to
compute anything. Second, rule-of-thumb households learn from optimizing ones, because last period’s decisions by the latter are part
of Ct−1. Third, the differences between CRt and COt are bounded, and will be zero in the steady state.
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Ct =
[
δ
1
ρC
ρ−1
ρ
H,t + (1− δ)
1
ρC
ρ−1
ρ
F,t
] ρ
ρ−1
ρ > 1
C∗t =
[
(δ∗)
1
ρ (C∗F,t)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− δ∗) 1ρ (C∗H,t)
ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
(7)
where ρ captures the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
δ > 12 is a parameter of home bias in preferences.CH and CF is the home and foreign goods
consumption index respectively, in the home country. In the foreign country C∗H and C∗F is the
home and foreign goods consumption index respectively. Consumption indices in the two countries
are defined as
CH,t =
[´ 1
0 ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1 , CF,t =
[´ 1
0 ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
C∗H,t =
[´ 1
0 c
∗
t (z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1 , C∗F,t =
[´ 1
0 c
∗
t (z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(8)
The aggregate consumption price index for the home and foreign country is specified as
Pt =
[
δ(PH,t)1−ρ + (1− δ)P 1−ρF,t
] 1
1−ρ
P ∗t =
[
δ∗(P ∗F,t)1−ρ + (1− δ∗)P ∗H,t1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ
(9)
where PH and PF are price indices for home and foreign goods, expressed in the domestic currency.
The price indices for the home and foreign country are defined as
PH,t =
[´ 1
0 pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ , PF,t =
[´ 1
0 pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
P ∗H,t =
[´ 1
0 p
∗
t (z)1−θdz
] 1
1−θ , P ∗F,t =
[´ 1
0 p
∗
t (z)1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
(10)
Capital markets are complete. The consumers of both countries purchase state uncontingent bonds
denominated in the domestic currency, Bt for domestic agents and B∗t for foreign agents at price
Qt. That is Bt denotes the home agent’s holdings of a one period nominal bond paying one unit
of the home currency.
The home agent maximizes her utility subject to the period budget constraint
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PtCt +Qt,t+1Bt+1 = Bt +WtLt + Πt (11)
where Wt is the nominal wage and Πt are nominal profits the individual receives.
3.2 First order conditions
Maximizing the utility function (6) subject to the budget constraint (11) yields the following first
order conditions
Qt,t+1 =
βPt
Pt+1
(
COt
COt+1
)σ
(12)
Lt = (COt )
−σ
γw
1
γ
t (13)
where the first equation is the usual Euler equation while the second determines the labor supply
schedule.
Individual demands for each good i = h, f produced in the home and in the foreign country
respectively are expressed as
ch,t(h) =
(
pht (h)
PH,t
)−θ (
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
δCt (14)
cf,t(h) =
(
p∗t (h)
PF,t
)−θ (
PF,t
Pt
)−ρ
(1− δ)Ct (15)
3.3 Risk sharing
The fraction of foreign households who choose their consumption optimally (ψ∗) , maximize their
utility subject to their budget constraint specified as
20
P ∗t C
∗
t +
Qt,t+1B
∗
t+1
zt
= B
∗
t
zt
+W ∗t L∗t + Π∗t (16)
where zt is the nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic currency price of the foreign currency.
Therefore, the Euler equation from the foreign agent’s maximization problem is
Qt,t+1 =
βP ∗t zt
P ∗t+1zt+1
(
CO∗t
CO∗t+1
)σ
(17)
International financial markets are complete. Domestic and foreign households trade in the state
contingent one period nominal bonds denominated in the domestic currency. Therefore, combining
(12) and (17) , I receive the following optimal risk sharing condition
(
CO∗t
COt
)−σ
= $qt (18)
where $ ≡
(
Cf0+x
Ch0+x
)−σ
P0
z0P ∗0
depends on initial conditions and qt = ztP
∗
t
Pt
is the real exchange rate.
3.4 Price setting
There is local currency pricing in both countries. That is, each firm sets one price for its goods
consumed domestically and another for the same good consumed abroad. Prices are sticky with a
price setting behavior a``a Calvo (1983). At each date, each firm changes its price with a probability
1− ω , regardless of the time since it last adjusted its price. The probability of not changing the
price, thus, is ω. The probability of not changing the price in the subsequent s periods is ωs.
Consequently, the price decision at time t determines profits for the next s periods. The price level
for home goods at date t will be defined as
PH,t =
[
ωP 1−θH,t−1 + (1− ω)p˜t(h)1−θ
] 1
1−θ (19)
In the literature on inflation dynamics in the Eurozone and the US its has been found that per-
sistence is one of the key features. Therefore, I introduce endogenous inflation persistence by
assuming that firms that are given the opportunity to adjust their prices will either follow a rule of
thumb (backward looking firms) or will chose the price that maximizes their expected discounted
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profits (forward looking firms), as in Gali et al. (2001). The price p˜t(h) that will be set at date t
is specified as
p˜t(h) = ζpBt (h) + (1− ζ) pFort (h) (20)
where ζ ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of backward looking firms, pBt (h) and pFort (h) is the price set by
the backward and the forward looking firms, respectively. A continuum of firms is assumed for the
home economy indexed by h ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm produces a differentiated good, with a technology
Yt(h) = AtLt(h) (21)
where At is a country specific productivity shock at date t which is assumed to follow a log
stationary process
The structure of productivity shocks across the two countries receives the following form
 αt
α∗t
 =
 ραt ραtα∗t
ρα∗tαt ρα∗t

 αt−1
α∗t−1
+
 εα,t
ε∗α∗,t

where
 εα,t
ε∗α∗,t
 ∼ N(0,Σ2), with Σ2 =
 σ2εa 0
0 σ2ε∗
α∗
.
Backward looking firms.
Backward looking firms set their prices according to the following rule
pBt (h) = PH,t−1 + piH,t−1 and pB∗t (h) = P ∗H,t−1 + pi∗H,t−1 (22)
Forward looking firms.
Forward looking firms set their prices by maximizing their expected discounted profits. Their
maximization problem comprises of two decisions. The one concerns the price for the domestic
market and the other the price charged in the foreign market, when it exports. Hence their
maximization problem is described as
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maxEt
∞∑
s=0
ωsQt,t+s
{
p˜t(h)yht+s(h) + εtp˜t∗(h)y
f
t+s(h)−W ht+sLht+s
}
(23)
where yit(h), i = h, f is the demand for the home good for home and foreign agents specified as
yht (pt(h)) =
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t
)−θ (
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
δ∗Ct, (24)
yft (p∗t (h)) =
(
p˜∗t (h)
P ∗H,t
)−θ (P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−ρ
(1− δ∗)C∗t (25)
The firm maximizes its objective function (23) subject to (24) in order to find the optimal price
for the home good in the home economy. It maximizes subject to (25), in order to find the optimal
price for the home good in the foreign economy. The firm chooses a price for the home good in
the home economy that satisfies the first order condition
Et
∞∑
s=0
ωsQt,t+syt+s(pt(h))
{
pt(h)− θ
θ − 1MCt+s
}
= 0
where MCt+s = Wt+sAt+s denotes the nominal marginal cost and
θ
θ−1 captures the optimal markup.
The optimal price for the home good in the home country is specified as
pt(h) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sMCt+sy
h
t+s(pt(h))
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+syht+s(pt(h))
(26)
Respectively, the optimal price for the home good in the foreign country is specified as
p∗t (h) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sMCt+sy
f
t+s(p∗t (h))
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sy
f
t+s(p∗t (h))zt+s
(27)
Aggregate price level
Dividing (19) by PH,t−1:
Π1−θH,t = ω + (1− ω)
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t−1
)1−θ
(28)
where ΠH,t ≡ PH,tPH,t−1 .
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Similarly, for the foreign goods consumed in the home economy:
Π1−θF,t = ω + (1− ω)
(
p˜t(f)
PF,t−1
)1−θ
(29)
The aggregate price level dynamics are specified, thus, as
Π1−ρt = δ
[(
PH,t−1
Pt−1
)
ΠH,t
]1−ρ
+ (1− δ)
[(
PF,t−1
Pt−1
)
ΠF,t
]1−ρ
(30)
4 Markov Switching Monetary Policy
Monetary policy in each country is conducted through nominal interest rate rules by each central
bank. Only foreign monetary policy is assumed to switch regimes over time. I first show that
even though domestic monetary policy does not change its policy, a switch in the foreign monetary
policy has important effects on home domestic output and inflation. In section 8, it is shown that
optimal monetary policy for the home country suggests it changes the coefficients in its interest rate
rule, depending on which regime foreign monetary policy lies in and, of course, on the probabilities
of a switch.
4.1 Policy rules
In this subsection I describe how Markov switching is introduced into the model. A markov-
switching interest rate rule for the foreign country is specified as
i∗t = i
∗ρ∗st
t−1
(
ξ∗st
(
pi∗t
p˜i∗
)φ∗
pi∗,st
y˜
∗φ∗
y∗,st
t
)1−ρ∗st
eε
∗
t (31)
where st captures the realized policy regime taking values 1 or 2. Regime follows a Markov
process with transition probabilities pji = P [st = i|st−1 = j], where i, j = 1, 2. ξt is a scale
parameter, p˜i∗ is the inflation target and y˜∗t is the output gap. This specification implies that
the policy maker and the private sector does not observe the current regime. Therefore, private
sector expectations about future inflation, for example, are specified as E
[
pit+1|Ω−st
]
, where Ω−st =
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{
st−1, . . . , εt, εt−1, . . . , ε∗t , ε
∗
t−1, . . .
}
captures its information set. Having assumed a two regime
markov process for monetary policy, the transition probability matrix P receives the form
P =
 p11 p12
p21 p22

where p11 measures the probability of staying at date t in regime 1 and p12 the probability of
moving to regime 2 at date t while being in regime 1 at date t− 1. p22 measures the probability of
staying in regime 2 at date t and p21 the probability of moving to regime 1 at date t while being
in regime 2 at date t− 1.
Monetary policy may switch because of various reasons. One of them could be the switch of the
interests of the central banker. There may be periods, for example, that he is more interested in
output gap fluctuations rather than inflation. As a result, the weight on inflation in the interest
rate rule could be lower. A monetary policy switch may also be justified by the change of the
central banker. As already mentioned, there is a number of papers arguing that the US monetary
policy has been more tolerant as regards inflation fluctuations in the pre-Volcker period.
The empirical findings in section 2 showed that there was a change in impulse response functions
and the volatility of inflation in the Eurozone, even though the monetary policy of the latter
remained unchanged. I keep this finding, at first, and assume that the interest rate of home
central bank has time invariant coefficients. A standard Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing
is adopted which can be summarized as
it = iρt−1
((
pit
p˜i
)φpi
y˜
φy
t
)1−ρ
eεt (32)
5 Log linearized model
A log linearized version of the relationships found in the previous section serves in providing a way
to deal with the problem of no closed form solution. The model is loglinearized around a specific
steady state. Given the markov-switching nature of the model, it is necessary to provide the
necessary and sufficient conditions which guarantee that the steady state of the model is unique,
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and, thus, independent of regime changes. This can be summarized in the following proposition,
which is a simple extension to that in Liu, Waggoner and Zha (2008) for the closed economy case
Proposition: The steady state equilibrium values of aggregate output, consumption and
the real wage in both countries are independent of monetary policy and are thus invariant
to monetary policy regime shifts. Moreover, as long as domestic monetary policy does
not change regimes, it is enough that
ξ∗st =
1
β
p˜i∗y¯∗−φ
∗
y∗,st ,
where y¯∗ is the steady state foreign output gap, so that the steady state nominal variables
are given by pi = p˜i, pi∗ = p˜i∗, R = λ
β
p˜i and R∗ = λ∗
β
p˜i∗, and which are independent of
regime changes as well.
Proof. See appendix A. 
5.1 Supply side
I use a first order Taylor approximation around the steady state of zero inflation rate. Log linearized
variables are denoted with a hat.
After loglinearizing the first order condition (12), the production function (21) the demand sched-
ules faced by each firm (24) and (25) and optimal price setting rules (26) and (27), I receive the
two relations describing the domestically consumed home goods inflation rate and the respective
of the home goods consumed in the foreign country
piH,t = bpiH,−1piH,t−1 + bpi∗H,−1pi
∗
H,t−1 + βEtpiH,t+1 + bpi∗Hpi
∗
H,t + bCCˆt + . . .
. . .+ bT Tˆt + bT ∗Tˆ ∗t + bq qˆt + baat (33)
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pi∗H,t = bpiH,−1piH,t−1 + bpi∗H,−1pi
∗
H,t−1 + βEtpi∗H,t+1 + b∗piHpiH,t + b
∗
CCˆt + . . .
. . .+ b∗T Tˆt + b∗T ∗Tˆ ∗t + b∗q qˆt + b∗aat (34)
where Tt = PF,tPH,t and T
∗
t =
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
denote relative prices in the home and foreign country respectively.
The log linearized aggregate price level relation (30) is specified as
pit = piH,t + (1− δ)(piF,t − piH,t) (35)
which can be further simplified as22
pit = piH,t + (1− δ)∆Tˆt
5.2 Demand side
In this section I proceed to the loglinearization of the Euler equation
CˆOt = κ(it − Etpit+1) + EtCˆOt+1 (36)
where κ = − 1
σ
, and using (5) the Euler equation receives the forward form, which includes both
backward and forward looking elements
Cˆt =
κψ
2− ψ (it − Etpit+1) +
1
2− ψEtCˆt+1 +
1− ψ
2− ψCˆt−1 (37)
Goods market clearing assumes the following two conditions
Y = CH + C∗H +Gt and Y ∗ = CF + C∗F +G∗t
where Gt and G∗t capture government expenditures for home and foreign country respectively,
assumed to follow an exogenous stationary AR(1) process gt = ρggt−1 +εg,t and g∗t = ρg∗g∗t−1 +ε∗g,t,
εg,t ∼ N(0, σ2εg) and ε∗g,t ∼ N(0, σ∗2εg ).
22To end up to that expression, I used equation Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piF,t − piH,t for the relative price which is reported later in the text.
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Combining equation (35) and the market clearing conditions, I derive the aggregate demand equa-
tion:
Yˆt = η1Yˆt−1 + η2EtYˆt+1 + η3(it − Etpit+1) + η4qˆt + η5qˆt+1 + η6qˆt−1 + . . .
. . .+ η7∆Tˆt + η8Et∆Tˆt+1 + η9∆Tˆ ∗t + η10Et∆Tˆ ∗t+1 (38)
where ηi , i = 1, .., 9 are defined in detail in appendix B.
5.3 Real exchange rate and relative prices
The real exchange rate dynamics are specified by the following relationship
∆qˆt = ∆zt + pi∗t − pit (39)
In the home country the price of imported goods relative to that of home goods is specified as
Tt = PF,tPH,t , whereas in the foreign country the relative price of home exported goods to foreign
goods is specified as T ∗t =
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
. Loglinearizing those two expressions we receive the following
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piF,t − piH,t Tˆ ∗t = Tˆ ∗t−1 + pi∗H,t − pi∗F,t
5.4 Flexible price equilibrium
At the flexible price equilibrium firms adjust their prices in each period. Each firm will set its
marginal cost equal to the optimal marginal cost (i.e. −log
(
θ
θ−1
)
) which is constant over time and
equal across firms. Since firms adjust their prices every period, monetary policy will not have any
real effects into the economy. The real marginal cost is specified by the following equations
mct = −log
(
θ
θ − 1
)
= −µ
mct = wt − αt − ν
where wt is the real wage, αt (log) productivity and ν a subsidy to labor.23 Solving for the case
with flexible prices, I receive the following set of equations describing the equilibrium processes for
23This subsidy serves in rendering the flexible price equilibrium efficient. This is achieved by setting the subsidy equal to the mark-up
(i.e. ν = µ), in order to remove the distortion associated with monopolistic competition.
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output, consumption, labor, real interest rate24, given by:
ynt = ψcc¯t−1 + ψζζ + ψaαt + ψa∗α∗t + ψggt + ψg∗g∗t (40)
cnt = ψ˜cc¯t−1 + ψζζ +
(
γδ∗ + σ
δ(γ + σ)− γ(1− δ∗)
)
ψααt −
(γ
σ
ψα∗
)
α∗t −
(γ
σ
ψg
)
gt −
(γ
σ
ψg∗
)
g∗t (41)
lnt = ψ˜cc¯t−1 + ψζζ +
(
γ(δ∗(1− σ)− (1− δ))− σ(1− δ)ψα
δ(γ + σ)− γ(1− δ∗)
)
αt − ψa∗α∗t + ψggt + ψg∗g∗t (42)
rnt =
˜˜ψcc¯t−1+
(
(γδ∗ + σ)(1− ρa)ψa
κδ(γ + σ)− γ(1− δ∗)
)
αt−
(
γ(1− ρa∗)ψa∗
κσ
)
α∗t −
(
γ(1− ρg)ψg
κσ
)
gt−
(
γ(1− ρg∗)ψg∗
κσ
)
g∗t (43)
5.5 Welfare
The Central Bank sets the interest rate in such a way to minimize a measure of social loss de-
rived by a second order Taylor expansion to the consumer’s utility function as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998), Amato and Laubach (2003), Pappa (2004) and Benigno and Benigno (2006). It
is summarized as25
Wt = −12ucCΞ{λ1(Yˆt − ynt )2 + λ2(Yˆ ∗t − y∗nt )2 + λ3(qˆt − qnt )2 + λ4∆qˆ2t + λ5∆Yˆ ∗t 2 + λ6∆Yˆt2 + . . .
+pi2H,t + λ7(piH,t − piH,t−1)2 + λ8(pi∗H,t)2 + λ9(pi∗H,t − pi∗H,t−1)2 + λ10(qˆt + Yˆt)2 + λ11(qˆt + Yˆ ∗t )2 + . . .
λ12(qˆt−1 + Yˆt)2 + λ13(qˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + λ13(qˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + . . .
λ14(Yˆ ∗t−1 − y∗nt−1)(qˆt−1 − qnt−1) + λ15(yt−1 − ynt−1)(y∗t−1 − y∗nt−1) + λ16(Cˆt − cnt )(qˆt − qnt ) + . . .
λ17(Yˆt + Yˆ ∗t−1)2 + λ18(Yˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + λ19(Yˆt−1 − ynt−1)(qt−1 − qnt−1) + . . .
+λ20(Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ ∗nt )(Yˆ ∗t−1− Yˆ ∗nt−1) +λ21(Yˆ ∗t−1 + qˆt)2 +λ22(Yˆt−1 + qˆt)2 +λ23(Yˆt−1− ynt−1)(qˆt−1− qnt−1) + . . .
λ24(Cˆ∗t−1−c∗nt−1)(qˆt−1−qnt−1)+λ25(qˆt−qnt )(qˆt−1−qnt−1)+λ26(Yˆt−1−ynt−1)(Yˆt−ynt )+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (44)
where the coefficients λi, i = 1, ..., 21 are functions of the structural parameters.
24The flexible price expression for the real exchange rate can be easily derived using the risk sharing condition.
25The derivation of the loss function is given in detail in the Appendix C.
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6 Model Solution
Given the Markov-Switching structure of the model, standard solution techniques cannot be applied
in order to find a solution. In the recent literature on markov-switching DSGE models, various
alternative techniques for solving such models have been suggested (Farmer, Waggoner and Zha,
2011; Farmer, Waggoner and Zha, 2008; Davig and Leeper, 2007; Svensson and Williams, 2005).
The technique I use is that of Farmer, Waggoner and Zha (2011). The virtue of that technique is
that it is able to find all possible minimal state variable (MSV) solutions. Moreover, the algorithm
is able to find whether the MSV solution is stationary (mean square stable) in the sense of Costa,
Fragoso and Marques (2004).26 The model can be written in the following state space form
A(st)Xt = B(st)Xt−1 + Ψ(st)εt + Π(st)ηt (45)
where Xt = [yt+1, y∗t+1, piH,t+1, pi∗H,t+1, piF,t+1, pi∗F,t+1, qt, zt+1, Tt+1, Tt, yt, y∗t , piH,t, . . .
. . . , pi∗H,t, piF,t, pi
∗
F,t, qt−1, zt, T
∗
t+1, T
∗
t , it, i
∗
t , at, a
∗
t ], εt is a 6 × 1 vector of i.i.d. stationary exogenous
shocks and ηt is an 8× 1 vector of endogenous random variables.
According to that technique the MSV equilibrium of the model takes the form
Xt = g1,stXt−1 + g2,stεt (46)
In order for the above minimal state variable solution to be stationary it must be that the the
eigenvalues of
(P ⊗ I242)diag [Γ1 ⊗ Γ1,Γ2 ⊗ Γ2] (47)
where Γj = A(j)Vj for j = 1, 2. And where Vj is a 24 × 10 matrix resulting from the Schur
decomposition of A(j)−1B(j). In the present model the largest eigenvalue was found to be equal
to 0.9174, implying, thus, that the MSV solution is stationary. The impulse responses and the
moments of the variables of interest are then derived from that stationary solution.
26For an extensive argument regarding the merits of the solution technique used in this paper over the alternative ones see Farmer et
al. (2011) and the references therein.
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7 Parameterization
In this section, the model is simulated so that to explore what regime switching implies about the
dynamic behavior of the key macroeconomic variables. In order to make my argument clearer the
impulse responses of inflation and output are compared to those when there is no regime switching,
as in Liu et al. (2009). Throughout this section I assume that it is only the foreign central bank
switching regimes. The home central bank is assumed to commit to the Taylor rule, independently
of what the foreign central bank does. Therefore, whenever I refer to the hawkish regime, I mean
an inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule of the foreign central bank that is greater than one.
Whenever I refer to the dovish regime, I mean an inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule of
the foreign country that is less than one.
Since it is only the foreign central bank that switches regimes in its monetary policy I have to
choose four different parameters for its interest rate rule, depending on the regime. The values
assigned are those from the Markov-switching interest rate rule for the the US estimated in section
2. That is, φ∗pi,1 = 1.1621 , φ∗pi,2 = 0.3298, φ∗x,1 = 1.5640 , φ∗x,2 = 0.9499. I also assume some interest
rate smoothing with ρ∗1 = ρ∗2 = 0.627.
As far as the rest of the parameters in the model are concerned, they are regime invariant.
Those parameters are the subjective discount factor β, the degree of relative risk aversion σ, the
elasticity of substitution between goods produced domestically θ, the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods ρ, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1/γ, the degree of price
stickiness for the home and the foreign country respectively ω and ω∗, the fractions of rule of
thumb firms for each country ζ and ζ∗, the fractions of rule of thumb consumers 1−ψ and 1−ψ∗,
the home bias parameters δ and δ∗ and the coefficients on the home country interest rate rule
φpi, φx and ρi. The values of the parameters are chosen according to the existing empirical and
theoretical literature in models similar to mine. They are summarized at table 5.
27Note that the results presented in this section hold also for ρ1 = ρ2 = 0
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Table 5: Parameter Values
Structural Parameters
β 0.99
σ 1.5
θ 10 (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2000)
ρ 3 (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2000)
γ 3 (Pappa, 2004)
ω = ω∗ 0.75 (Adjemian, Paries & Smets, 2008)
δ = δ∗ 0.67
ζ = ζ∗ 0.5 (Adjemian, Paries & Smets, 2008)
ψ = ψ∗ 0.4 (Adjemian, Paries & Smets, 2008)
Policy Rule Coefficients
Home
φpi = 1.5 φy = 0.5 ρ = 0.75
Foreign
Regime 1: φ∗pi∗,1 = 1.1621 φ∗y∗,1 = 1.5640 ρ∗1 = 0.6
Regime 2: φ∗pi∗,2 = 0.3298 φ∗y∗,2 = 0.9499 ρ∗2 = 0.6
Probabilities
p11 = 0.99 p22 = 0.99
7.1 Impulse responses
To gauge how the possibility of a future switch in foreign monetary affects the dynamics of the
macroeconomic variables in the home country, I compute the impulse responses in the Markov-
switching model following a one standard deviation monetary policy shock in both countries.28 In
order to emphasize the importance of expectation effects, the impulse responses from the regime
switching model (red dashed line) are compared to those from the constant parameter model (blue
solid line).29
28The results reported in this section hold for demand and productivity shocks in either country as well. I do not report them in
order to save space.
29As already mentioned, by constant parameter, I mean the absorbing state, i.e. when there is a zero probability of switching to
another regime.
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Figure 4: Home and Foreign inflation responses to a MP shock
(a) Home CPI
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(b) Foreign CPI
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Notes: The red dashed line impulse responses are from the Markov switching model. The blue solid line responses
are from the constant parameter model. Impulse responses in the hawkish regime are illustrated on the left panel
in each graph. Impulse responses in the dovish regime are illustrated on the right panel in each graph.
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In figure 4 the impulse responses of the CPI rate are plotted for each of the two regimes. As it
is evident, inflation responses, in both countries are dampened30 in the dovish regime when the
probability of a switch to the hawkish regime becomes non zero (red dashed line) after both a
home and a foreign monetary policy shock. Inflation fluctuates at considerably lower levels than in
the absorbing state (blue line). This change in the behavior of inflation is due to the expectations
formation effect. Agents in both countries assign a positive probability on the foreign monetary
policy becoming hawkish, affecting, the behavior of inflation in the home (and the foreign) country.
Home and foreign inflation are better controlled. As far as home inflation is concerned, this result
is brought about solely, by home agents expectations, without any change in the policy of the
home central bank. This is one of the key results in this paper.
Result 1: In the dovish regime, the response of home inflation to monetary policy shocks
is dampened. This result is purely expectations driven and independent of monetary policy
in the home country. It is enough, that agents in the home country assign a positive
probability on the foreign monetary policy becoming hawkish in the future, while it being
currently dovish.
On the other hand, there is an amplifying effect on inflation in the hawkish regime. Inflation
responses in both countries seem to be slightly amplified. It is evident that the stabilizing effect,
generated in the dovish regime, is stronger than the amplifying effect. This can be observed by
looking at the distance between the red dashed and the blue solid impulse responses in the hawkish
and the dovish regime, respectively. However, as I am showing later, this does not imply that the
overall stabilizing effect on either home or foreign inflation is stronger than the amplifying effect.
Note also, the asymmetry in the responses of inflation in each regime, for both countries. This
is because of the asymmetry in expectation effects which arises because of the existence of the
hawkish regime. The latter is strong enough, so that to make the stabilizing effect stronger than
the amplifying. Additionally, the possibility of a future switch to hawkish regime helps anchor
agent’s expectations (Liu et al., 2009).
30From now on, I will use the term “stabilizing effect” for the case where the effects of a shock, as measured by the impulse responses,
are dampened, and the term “amplifying effect” when the effects of a shock are amplified.
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Figure 5: Home and Foreign output responses to a MP shock
(a) Home output
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(b) Foreign output
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Notes: The red dashed line impulse responses are from the Markov switching model. The blue solid line responses
are from the constant parameter model. Impulse responses in the hawkish regime are illustrated on the left panel
in each graph. Impulse responses in the dovish regime are illustrated on the right panel in each graph.
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The same reasoning applies to output responses, illustrated in figure 5. Output impulse re-
sponses in both countries exhibit a pattern similar to those of inflation. Following a home or
foreign monetary policy shock Output in either country is clearly less volatile in the dovish regime
for a positive probability of moving to the hawkish regime (red dashed line). Home and foreign
output responses, in the dovish regime, are dampened, while they are amplified in the hawkish
regime compared to the constant parameter case (blue solid lines). The stabilizing effect is clearly
stronger. Home output fluctuations are controlled better when home agents attach a positive
probability to the foreign monetary policy becoming hawkish in the future, while being currently
dovish.
The conclusion drawn until here concerns the two monetary policy shocks only. The dynamics
of the model are rich enough and one cannot derive any inference by focusing only on one shock.
In order to make this point clearer, I compute the changes in volatilities on inflation and output
relative to the absorbing state, at table 6 below.
Table 6: Inflation and Output relative volatilities
Inflation Output Losses
Home Foreign Home Foreign Home Foreign
Hawkish 1.1714 1.7205 1.2709 1.3255 1.6289 1.4633
Dovish 0.7078 0.4495 0.7456 0.7455 0.5610 0.4942
Table 6 shows that there are significant decreases in inflation and output volatility, relative to
the absorbing state (i.e. no regime switching case), when foreign monetary policy is dovish. In
particular, home country’s inflation is 0.7078 times or approximately 30% lower than in the case
where the probability of staying in the dovish regime is one. This fall is larger for the foreign
country, 0.45 times or 55% lower. On the other hand, a positive probability of a switch to the
dovish regime increases home inflation relative to the absorbing state by 17%, while foreign inflation
is increased by 72%. The stabilizing effect, thus, on home inflation is much stronger than the
amplifying effect. The opposite hods for foreign inflation, where the amplifying effect is much
stronger than the stabilizing.
The overall amplifying effect seems to dominate in output fluctuations, as well. In particular,
36
home output is 27% more volatile in the hawkish regime relative to the absorbing state, while it is
25% less volatile in the dovish regime. Foreign output is 33% more volatile in the hawkish regime
and 25% less volatile in the dovish regime.
Markov-switching closed economy models examine the effectiveness of regime switching mone-
tary policy by looking at the change in volatilities of inflation and output only. Given the structure
of those models, judging such a policy relying on changes in volatility, or on changes in a welfare
measure leads to the same conclusions. In an open economy model, as the one in this paper, judg-
ing Markov-switching monetary policy by simply looking at the changes in volatilities of inflation
and output could lead to the wrong conclusions. As the welfare measure (42) shows the dynamics
in the model are far more rich than those in a closed economy model. Therefore, alternative poli-
cies would be better compared based on an appropriate welfare measure, rather than by observing
changes in volatilities of some variables. I use the relative changes in the welfare measure (42) as a
guide, in order to figure out whether Markov-switching monetary policy generates strong enough
stabilizing effects31 for both economies. As is clear in table 6, the relative fall in home welfare loss
in the dovish regime is smaller, in absolute terms, than its relative increase in the hawkish regime.
In particular, in the dovish regime, a non-zero probability of a switch to the hawkish regime causes
home welfare loss to be 0.5610 times or approximately 44% lower relative to the absorbing state.
On the other hand, it is 1.6289 times or 63% higher relative to the absorbing state, in the hawkish
regime. Foreign welfare loss rises by 46% in the hawkish regime, and falls by approximately 50%
in the dovish regime, relative to the absorbing state. The above results can be summarized as
follows.
Result 2: Markov switching monetary policy in the foreign country generates a stabiliz-
ing (dovish regime) and an amplifying (hawkish regime) effect on output and inflation.
The stabilizing effect is stronger than the amplifying effect for home inflation. As regards
home output and foreign inflation and output, the amplifying effect is stronger
31By strong enough stabilizing effects, I mean that the latter is much stronger than the amplifying effects, that is effects caused by
the increase in volatility relative to the absorbing state in the hawkish regime.
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Result 3: The overall stabilizing effects are stronger in the foreign country and weaker
in the home, in terms of the welfare measure (44).
So far I have shown that changes in the volatilities and the impulse responses of key macroeconomic
variables of the home country may be caused by changes in the way monetary policy is conducted
in the foreign country only. In figures 6 and 7 below I show the simulated paths of inflation in each
country. The model was simulated for 140 periods allowing for a random date of regime switching
in foreign monetary policy. I assume that the initial regime is the hawkish. The regime changing
date is 60 (switch to the dovish regime). For convenienve a green dotted vertical line is drawn on
the regime changing date. In the upper panel in both figures, along with inflation in the MSDSGE
model (red line) I plot home (foreign) inflation, had foreign monetary policy stayed in the hawkish
regime forever (blue solid line). In the bottom panel inflation in the MSDGE model (red dashed
line) is compared to inflation, had foreign monetary policy been always dovish (blue solid line).
As the upper panel in figure 5 illustrates, inflation in the home country appears to be fluctuating
within a wider band while still being in regime 1. On the regime change date (period 60) home
inflation jumps well above the blue solid line. It keeps fluctuating at higher levels compared to its
behaviour in the constant parameter case, the only exception being from period 80 until 110 where
its behaviour resembles that in the no regime switching case. The higher volatility of home inflation
is due the expectations formation effect. As the probability of a switch in foreign monetary policy
rises, inflation in the hawkish regime starts to fluctuate more. This implies that the home Central
Bank should change its policy as well, in order to eliminate as much as possible the additional
volatility on domestic inflation.
At the lower panel in figure 6, inflation in the MSDGE model (red dashed line) is illustrated
along with inflation when the dovish regime is the absorbing state (blue solid line). Home inflation
in the regime switching case resembles that in the constant parameter. From the regime change
date, its behaviour changes. It fluctuates at slightly higher levels than the absorbing state until
period 90, but from that period onwards it fluctuates at consistently lower levels. This is because
home agents incorporate in their expectations the probability of a switch to the hawkish regime
in foreign monetary policy.
38
Figure 6: Home inflation
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Notes: Top panel: Blue solid line: home inflation when the foreign central bank is hawkish forever. Red dashed
line: home inflation in the Markov switching model. Bottom panel: Blue solid line: home inflation when the foreign
central bank is dovish forever. Red dashed line: home inflation in the Markov switching model.
The path of foreign inflation is shown in figure 7. At the top panel, foreign inflation fluctuates
within a slightly wider region for most of the period in regime 1 (i.e. until date 60). As already
mentioned, the reason for this effect is the expectation formation effect becoming stronger as the
probability of a regime switch increases and as the regime change date approaches. From date 60
onwards (Regime 2), foreign inflation keeps fluctuating at a constantly wider region than otherwise.
Again the blue solid line shows how inflation fluctuates when the foreign central bank stays in the
hawkish regime forever. The red dashed line shows how inflation behaves when the foreign central
bank switches from being hawkish to dovish. Notice in regime 1 (hawkish) the effect on foreign
inflation dynamics of the positive probability of a switch to the dovish regime. Inflation falls until
period 30. But after that period it is constantly higher than in the constant parameter case. When
foreign monetary policy switches to the dovish regime, foreign inflation is more volatile than in
the absorbing state.
On the other hand, foreign inflation is considerably stabilized relative to the case where the
foreign Central Bank is always dovish, as is shown in the bottom panel of figure 6. The red dashed
line fluctuates at a narrower band than the blue line.
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Figure 7: Foreign inflation
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Notes: Top panel: Blue solid line: foreign inflation when the foreign central bank is hawkish forever. Red dashed
line: foreign inflation in the Markov switching model. Bottom panel: Blue solid line: foreign inflation when the
foreign central bank is dovish forever. Red dashed line: foreign inflation in the Markov switching model.
7.2 Alternative interest rate rules.
Having analyzed the effects of foreign policy regime switching under standard Taylor rules, I turn
now the focus to alternative rules. I allow for different or additional targets in the home country’s
interest rate rule. In particular, I first look at what PPI instead of CPI inflation targeting implies
for the home country. Second, I examine the importance of having a real exchange rate target
in the home interest rate rule. Third, I introduce foreign variables in the rule. Throughout this
section I assume that the interest rate rule of the foreign country is exactly the same as it was in
the previous section. That is, the foreign Central Bank keeps targeting foreign CPI and output
gap.
Targeting PPI inflation.
When a CPI target is replaced by a target for PPI the interest rate rule of the home central bank
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is specified as
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (φpiHpiH,t + φyy˜t) (48)
As a first exercise, I compare the performance of rule (48) to the benchmark rule in which the
home central bank targets CPI inflation and the output gap.
Table 7: Inflation and Output relative volatilities (Rule (48) vs Benchmark)
Inflation (CPI) Output Losses
Home Foreign Home Foreign Home Foreign
Hawkish 0.9532 0.7746 0.9610 0.9282 0.9212 0.9588
Dovish 0.9887 0.9101 0.9431 0.9225 0.8830 1.0067
The result from table 7 show that it is better for the home country to target PPI rather than CPI
inflation.32 Home loss is lower by 8% in the hawkish regime and 12% in the dovish. Foreign loss
in the hawkish regime is lower compared to that under the benchmark rule where CPI inflation
is targeted by the home Central Bank. On the other hand foreign loss is almost unchanged in
the dovish regime. Home output and CPI inflation are marginally less volatile in both regimes.
The foreign country has considerable benefits regarding CPI inflation volatility in the hawkish
regime. Foreign inflation volatility is 0.7746 times lower in the hawkish and 0.9101 times lower in
the dovish regime.
The intuition behind the results above is that, by targeting home PPI inflation, the home
central bank isolates the latter from the effects of additional volatility in CPI inflation resulting
from higher volatility in imported goods inflation (piF,t). Imported goods inflation is more volatile
in both regimes, by 1.0378 in the hawkish and by 1.0192 in the dovish. Which effect will dominate
depends also on the degree of openness of the home country. Not surprisingly, with a degree
of home bias in consumption equal to 0.67, the stabilizing effect on home PPI in both regime
dominates, leading to lower volatility in CPI inflation.
Lower home output volatility is justified by the lower volatility in the home real interest rate in
both regimes. In particular, it is 0.9203 times less volatile in the hawkish regime and 0.9165 less
volatile in the dovish regime.
32The coefficients in rule (46) are exactly the same as in the baseline calibration, that is φpiH = 1.5, φy = 0.5 and ρ = 0.6.
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Targeting the Real Exchange Rate.
I now extend the benchmark interest rate rule of the home Central Bank by adding a real exchange
rate target. The rule has the following form
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (φpipiH,t + φyy˜t + φqqt) (49)
As above, I compare the performance of rule (49) to that used in the baseline calibration.33 Note,
though, the substantial differences between rule (49) and the Taylor rule in the baseline calibration.
In the former, the home Central Bank targets the home PPI inflation and the real exchange rate.34
The only common feature is the output gap target.
Table 8: Inflation and Output relative volatilities (Rule (49) vs Benchmark)
Inflation (CPI) Output Losses
Home Foreign Home Foreign Home Foreign
Hawkish 0.9097 0.6770 0.9244 0.8915 0.8518 0.8904
Dovish 0.9978 0.8586 0.9421 0.9060 0.8743 1.1126
When the home central bank targets the home PPI inflation along with a target for the real ex-
change rate the benefits in terms of welfare losses, compared to the benchmark case, are significant.
Home loss is almost 15% lower in the hawkish regime and approximately 13% lower in the dovish
regime relative to the Taylor rule. The main driving force for the lower volatility in both regimes
seems to be the real exchange rate. The latter is almost 7% less volatile in the hawkish regime, and
43% less volatile in the dovish. The most crucial conclusion from rule (49) is that the amplifying
effects of a possibility of a switch to the dovish regime in the future are considerably decreased.
Targeting foreign variables.
One of the important questions in open economy monetary economics has been that of whether
central banks should target foreign variables or not. Empirically, it seems that such targets can
provide the central banks some information in order to control better the overall volatility in the
domestic economy (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998). One may question the implementability
of such rules. Targeting foreign variables implies that the home Central Bank has sufficient in-
33The coefficient on the real exchange rate is φq = 0.1.
34The performance of rule (47) with a CPI inflation target, instead, was also checked. The accrued benefits, however, were negligible.
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formation about those, so that to be sure about which direction should it move its instrument.
Additionally, in practice, it is not even certain the size and the sign of the effect such variables have
on domestic economy. I, however, abstract from this criticism by sticking to the initial assumptions
of the model. The class of such rules considered receive the following form35
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (φpipit + φyy˜t + φy∗ y˜∗t ) (50)
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (φpipit + φyy˜t + φpi∗pi∗t ) (51)
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) (φpipit + φyy˜t +
p∑
s=0
φi∗,pi
∗
t−s) (52)
The results for the performance of each of the above interest rate rules above are summarized at
table 9 below
Table 9: Inflation and Output relative volatilities (vs Benchmark)
Inflation (CPI) Output Losses
Home Foreign Home Foreign Home Foreign
Rule 50 φy∗ = −0.1
Hawkish 0.8508 0.3928 0.7775 0.6716 0.6033 0.6407
Dovish 0.9879 0.7395 0.8269 0.7264 0.6578 1.1251
Rule 51 φpi∗ = 0.5
Hawkish 0.9371 0.9726 0.9471 0.8988 0.8922 0.9549
Dovish 0.9537 0.8427 0.9737 0.9496 0.9393 1.0918
Rule 52 φi∗,p = −0.1
Hawkish 0.7699 0.3683 0.6045 0.4366 0.3735 0.3037
Dovish 0.9335 0.6651 0.7083 0.5441 0.4846 0.8195
The results at table 9 suggest that rule (52) performs much better than any other alternative rule
considered in this section. Home country’s welfare loss is considerably lower compared to that in
the baseline calibration, in both regimes. Welfare loss of the foreign country is dramatically lower
than under the benchmark interest rate rule in both regimes.
As for output relative volatilities, they are much lower compared to the benchmark case for both
35The coefficients on inflation, the output gap and smoothing are φpi = 1.5, φy = 0.5 and ρ = 0.75.
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countries in both regimes. As regards home inflation it is 7% less volatile in the dovish regime and
23% less volatile in the hawkish. The effects on foreign inflation are more pronounced. The latter
is approximately 63% less volatile in the hawkish regime and 34% less volatile in the dovish.
But the main criterion to judge the overall effects in each country is welfare loss. Since the
latter is considerably lower for both countries, it follows that both benefit when the home Central
Bank adopts rule (52) instead of the standard Taylor rule.
A direct reaction of the home Central Bank to foreign interest rate fluctuations implies higher
weights on both home inflation and output. In fact, by using the UIP condition in rule (52) where
the home Central Bank reacts only contemporaneously to the foreign interest rate, I receive the
following
it = (
ρ
1 + φi∗,0
)it−1 + (1− ρ)
[
φpi
1 + φi∗,0
pit +
φy
1 + φi∗,0
y˜t +
φi∗,0
1 + φi∗,0
∆zˆt+1
]
A negative φi∗,0 implies higher weights on output and inflation, hence a more aggressive reaction
against their fluctuations. As I am showing in the next section, it is optimal for the home central
bank to raise the coefficients on inflation and output as the probability of shifting to the dovish
regime in the future increases.
8 Optimal policy with regime switches
So far in the analysis, the parameters in the interest rate rule of the home country have been
assumed to be constant over time, independently of what the foreign monetary policy is and have
been set arbitrarily, corresponding to the standard Taylor rule suggested by Taylor (1993). In this
section I am looking for the optimal policy conditional on the coefficients in the interest rate rule
of the foreign country. I am not interested in the cooperative allocation.36 In this paper I focus
on the optimal discretionary policy for the home central bank conditional on regime switches in
foreign monetary policy. For this reason, I will make use of dynamic programming techniques.
The algorithm I use is that of Soderlind (1998), but extended to a Markov-switching framework.
36For an example about the cooperative solution in a two-country model see Benigno and Benigno (2006).
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8.1 Formulation
The procedure followed in this section is similar to that in Zampolli (2006). The policy maker
chooses the control it (i.e. the interest rate rule) which minimizes the expected value of the
intertemporal loss function, stated in the previous section and summarized as
∞∑
t=0
βtW (ht, it) (53)
subject to h0, s0 given, and the model describing the economy
ht+1 = A(st+1)ht +B(st+1)it + Cεt+1 t ≥ 0 (54)
where L(ht, it) is the period loss function, β is the discount factor, ht is a 24 × 1 vector of state
variables, it is the control variable (i.e. the interest rate) and εt is a 6 × 1 vector of white noise
shocks with variance covariance matrix Σε and C is a 24× 6
The loss function (42) expanded by a weight on interest rate stabilization can be conveniently
expressed as follows
W (ht, it) = h
′
tRht + itQit (55)
where R is a 24× 24 positive definite matrix and Q is a scalar. The matrices A and B, as already
mentioned, are stochastic and take on different values depending on the regime st, t = 1, 2.
8.2 The Bellman equation
The policy maker in a markov-switching environment needs to find the interest rate rule that is
state-contigent. This rule describes the way that the control variable, the interest rate, should
be set as a function of both the state variables and the regime occurring at date t. Therefore,
as in Zampolli (2006) a Bellman equation is associated with each regime. In other words, the
policy maker solves her minimization problem conditional on the regime. The regime j dependent
Bellman equation is specified, thus, as follows
V (ht, j) = maxit
{
W (ht, it) + βΣ2i=1pjiEt [V (ht+1, i)]
}
(56)
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where V (ht, j) is a function of the state variables ht, the regime prevailing at date t and represents
the continuation value of the optimal dynamic programming problem at t.
The value function for this problem is
V (ht, j) = h
′
tPjht + dj, j = 1, 2 (57)
where Pj is a 24 × 24 symmetric positive semidefinite matrix, while di is a scalar. The optimal
policy is given by
i(ht, j) = −Fjht, j = 1, 2 (58)
where Fj is a 24 × 1 matrix, depending on Pj. That is, matrix Fj specifies the coefficients in
the policy rule of the central bank. Those coefficients are regime specific. Maximizing, thus, the
Bellman subject to the constraints, the matrix Fj is specified as
Fj =
(
Q+ βpj1B
′
1PiB1 + βpj2B
′
2PiB2
)−1
β
(
pj1A
′
1PiB1 + pj2A
′
2PiB2
)
(59)
where matrix Pi has been already determined by a set of interrelated Riccati equations, which
specify a system with the following form
Pj = R + βpj1A
′
1PiA1 + βpj2A
′
2PiA2 − . . .
−β2
(
pj1A
′
1PiB1 + pj2A
′
2PiB2
)(
Q+ βpj1B
′
1PiB1 + βpj2B
′
2PiB2
)−1 (
pj1B
′
1PiA1 + pj2B
′
2PiA2
)
(60)
8.3 How should home central bank react?
Having specified the formulation of the policy problem of the home central bank, in this section,
I find the optimal rule conditional on regime shifts in foreign monetary policy. Figures 8 and 9
summarize the key results.
The first result from the two figures above is that the home central bank must change the
coefficients in its interest rate rule as foreign monetary policy changes over time. Therefore, it is
not optimal fro the home country to adopt a regime invariant interest rate rule. The second is that,
the weight on PPI inflation must increase as the probability of foreign monetary policy switching
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to the dovish regime increases.37 The opposite holds as the probability of foreign monetary policy
switching to the hawkish regime increases. In this case the weight on PPI inflation falls. The
weight on the output gap changes similarly. That is, it rises as the probability of switching to the
dovish regime increases, and falls as the probability of moving to the hawkish regime increases.
Figure 8: Coefficients when the foreign central bank is hawkish
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Figure 9: Coefficients when the foreign central bank is dovish
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37As in Svensson (1998), CPI inflation pit is not included in the optimal reaction function of the home Central Bank. This is due to
the fact that it is not an independent state variable, but, rather, a linear combination of other state variables, i.e. piH,t and piF,t.
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From the computation of optimal policy of the home central bank I end up to the following two
results:
Result 4: As the probability of the foreign monetary policy switching to the dovish
regime increases, the home central bank should become more aggressive to home PPI
inflation fluctuations. As the probability of the foreign monetary policy switching to the
hawkish regime increases, the home central bank should become less aggressive to home
PPI inflation fluctuations.
Result 5: The home central bank must attach a weight on home PPI inflation that is
always greater than one. That is, it must be always hawkish. Moreover, it must be even
more aggressive to PPI inflation fluctuations, as the foreign central bank becomes dovish.
8.4 The importance of always reacting optimally.
In this section I focus on the importance, in terms of welfare, of an optimal reaction of the home
central bank to changes in foreign monetary policy. I assume that the home Central Bank always
reacts optimally conditional on foreign monetary policy. Again, I compute the relative welfare
losses. That is, the losses in each regime are expressed relative to those when each corresponding
regime is an absorbing state.
Table 10: Relative Losses
Losses
Home Foreign
Hawkish 1.0003 1.0023
Dovish 1.0000 0.9990
The results at table 10 show that when the home central bank reacts always optimally to foreign
monetary policy, the home country is entirely unaffected by regime shifts in foreign monetary policy.
Home welfare loss remains unchanged in the dovish regime relative to the constant parameter case.
In the hawkish regime the increase in home loss is tiny. More importantly, the foreign country
benefits when the home central bank reacts optimally to changes in its policy. Foreign welfare loss
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is only 0.2% higher in the hawkish regime and 0.1% lower in the dovish regime, compared to the
absorbing state. Therefore, optimal reaction in the home country is enough to eliminate the large
fluctuations in overall volatility in both countries.
Finally, as a last exercise, I compare rule (52) with the case where the home central bank reacts
optimally. Given that this rule yields the lowest home welfare losses (relative to the Taylor rule
considered in the baseline calibration) than any other of the alternative rules considered in this
paper, the comparison of its performance relative to the optimal reaction of the home central bank
is enough to show how much simple rules are away from the optimal case.
Table 11: Rule (52) vs Optimal
Losses
Home Foreign
Hawkish 3.4663 2.0603
Dovish 3.6832 5.2785
As table 11 shows rule (52) yields losses that are 3.5 times higher in the home country and 2 times
higher in the foreign, in the hawkish regime. As regards losses in the dovish regime, they are 3.7
and 5 times higher in the home and the foreign country respectively, relative to the losses accruing
under the optimal reaction function.
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I show that regime shifts in the monetary policy of one country have important
effects on other economies. My new empirical evidence shows that the monetary policy of the Fed
has changed since the start of the Euro and is found to be the main reason for the changes in
the dynamics of inflation and output gap in the Eurozone. Furthermore, changes in the monetary
policy of the Fed are well captured by a Taylor rule whose coefficients change according a two-state
Markov-switching process. The monetary policy of the ECB, though, is found to be fairly stable.
Taking into account the empirical findings, I examine the international effects of changes in
monetary policy theoretically. I construct a two country DSGE model in which foreign monetary
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policy switches regimes over time. I give further insight regarding the effects of regime switching
in monetary policy both domestically and abroad. Home monetary policy was initially assumed
to be time invariant and follow the Taylor rule with some interest rate smoothing. Home inflation
is found to be affected both in terms of volatility and in terms of its response to alternative
shocks, by regime shifts in foreign monetary policy (and, consequently, by the change in inflation
expectations). Foreign monetary policy regime shifts generate a stabilization and an amplifying
effect on output and inflation, both in the foreign and the home country. Which effect arises
depends on which regime the foreign monetary policy lies in. When the latter is dovish there
is a stabilization effect. That is, impulse responses of inflation and output are dampened, given
a positive probability of the foreign monetary policy becoming hawkish. On the contrary, when
foreign monetary policy is hawkish there is an amplifying effect in both countries, given a positive
probability of the foreign monetary policy becoming dovish. That is, the impulse responses are
more volatile. Moreover, there is an asymmetry on the size of each effect. In particular, I show
that the stabilization effect is stronger in the foreign, but weaker in the home country, based on a
welfare measure, derived by a second order approximation of the agents utility function.
Finally, through the solution of the optimal policy problem of the home central banker, condi-
tional on foreign monetary policy switching regimes over time, I show that it is optimal to follow a
time varying interest rate rule. When the home central bank reacts optimally, the effects of regime
switches in foreign monetary policy on the home country are completely eliminated. Moreover,
the foreign country seems to benefit a lot, in terms of its welfare measure, when the home country
reacts optimally to changes in its policy.
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Appendix A: The steady State
In this section I compute the steady state of the the real variables, first and then through the proof
of proposition 1, the steady state of the nominal variables.
Given that in the steady state each firm will change the same price in both countries, the law of
one price holds and, hence, PPP holds as well. Therefore the real exchange rate is pegged to one.
Q = 1
Given an international risk sharing condition, PPP implies that at the steady state consumption
levels will be equalized across the two countries. Hence
C = C∗
From the representative household’s labor supply decision, I have for each country that
Lγ = C−σW
P
L∗γ = C∗−σW
∗
P ∗
while from the firms production function in each country, I have that
Y = L and Y ∗ = L∗
As already mentioned, firms will set the same price in each country. From their maximization
problem it follows that prices at the steady state will be specified as follows
pH = Sp∗H = PH =
θ
θ − 1
W
A
p∗F
S
= pF = P ∗F =
θ
θ − 1
W ∗
A∗
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and since the law of one price holds, the demand for the home and foreign produced good respec-
tively will be specified as
YH =
(
PH
P
)−ρ
C
YF =
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−ρ
C
Combining, thus, the above equations, along with the household’s optimal labor decision I end up
to the following expressions for the consumption levels in the steady state
C =
[
θ − 1
θ
(
PH
P
)1+ργ
A
] 1
γ+σ
C∗ =
[
θ − 1
θ
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)1+ργ
A∗
] 1
γ+σ
As in Benigno (2004), note that both PH
P
andPF
P
are both functions of T ≡ PF
PH
, so that the
two equations above uniquely determine C and T . Having specified the steady state values of
consumption output and relative prices, I can proceed to the proof of proposition in section 5.
Proof of Proposition in section 5
The foreign households intertemporal decision (14) implies that in the steady state the following
will be true for the nominal interest rate
i∗ = pi
∗
β
Additionally, the assumed interest rate rule of the foreign country (31) receives the following form
in the steady state
i = ξs
(
pi∗
p˜i∗
)φ∗
pi∗
y∗φ
∗
y∗,s
Combining the above two equations for the foreign interest rate, solving for ξs and recalling that
the interest rate in the steady state is such that foreign inflation pi∗ hits its target p˜i∗, I receive the
following
ξs =
1
β
pi∗y∗φ
∗
y∗,s
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Therefore the steady state interest rate is
i∗ = p˜i
∗
β
and, as already mentioned, inflation at the steady state is pi∗ = p˜i∗. Nominal variables, thus, are
independent of policy regime in the steady state. Moreover, as already shown above, the real
variables (i.e. consumption, output, labor) are independent of policy regime, as well, in the steady
state.
Appendix B: Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand
In this section I derive the PPI inflation rates (33) and (34) and the aggregate demand equation
(38) reported in the text.
Aggregate Supply
Forward looking producers in the home country maximize their profits in the home market by
choosing the optimal price specified as
pFort (h) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+sMCt+sy
h
t+s(pt(h))
Et
∑∞
s=0 ω
sQt,t+syht+s(pt(h))
where yht+s(pt(h)) is specified in (24) in the text. The optimal price above rearranged can be written
in the following form
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ωβ)sC
−σ
t+sPH,t+s
Pt+s
[{
pFort (h)
PH,t+s
−
(
θ
θ − 1
)
Wt+s
At+sPH,t+s
}
yht+s(pt(h))
]
= 0
and its loglinear approximation is summarized as follows
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ωβ)s
 ˆˆpFort,t+s(h)−
 Ŵt+s
At+sPH,t+s
 = 0 (61)
where ˆˆpFort (h) = ln
(
pFort (h)
PH,t+s
)
. Using the household’s optimality condition (13) I can expand the
marginal cost term in the above relationship as follows
Ŵt+s
At+sPH,t+s
= γ (yˆt+s(h)− at) + σ
ψ
Cˆt+s +
(1− ψ)σ
ψ
Cˆt+s−1 + at+s + (1− δ) Tˆt+s
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where I have used the fact that CˆOt = 1ψ Cˆt − 1−ψψ Cˆt−1 . Furthermore, by suing the demand for the
home good yˆt+s(h) can be expanded as follows
yˆt+s(h) = −ρδ ˆ˜pt,t+s(h) + ρδ (1− δ) Tˆt+s + Cˆt+s − ρ (1− δ∗) ˆ˜p∗t,t+s(h) . . .
−ρδ∗ (1− δ∗) Tˆ ∗t+s −
(1− δ∗)
σ
qˆt+s
But ˆ˜pt+s(h) and ˆ˜p∗t,t+s(h) are specified as
ˆ˜pt+s(h) = ζpˆFort+s (h) + (1− ζ) pˆBt+s(h)
ˆ˜p∗t,t+s(h) = ζpˆ∗Fort+s (h) + (1− ζ) pˆ∗Bt+s(h)
for the home good in the home and the foreign market respectively. From (19) ˆ˜pt(h) and ˆ˜p∗t (h)
can be expressed as follows
ˆ˜pt,t+s(h) =
ω
1− ωpiH,t −
s∑
i=1
piH,t+i
ˆ˜p∗t,t+s(h) =
ω∗
1− ω∗pi
∗
H,t −
s∑
i=1
pi∗H,t+i
Combining the above relationships for the prices set at date t , I can express the price set by the
forward looking firms as follows
pˆFort (h)− PH,t−1 =
1
(1− ω)(1− ζ)piH,t −
ζ
(1− ω)(1− ζ)piH,t−1
Solving for ˆˆpFort,t+s(h) in (61) and combining all the above relationships I end to the following
relationship for PPI inflation
piH,t =
ζ
(ζ + ω (1− ζ) + θγδω (1− ζ))piH,t−1 +
(ω − ω∗) (γθ (1− δ∗) (1− ζ) (1− ω))
(1− ω∗) (ζ + ω (1− ζ) + θγδω (1− ζ))pi
∗
H,t + . . .
(1− ωβ) (1− ζ) (1− ω)
(ζ + ω (1− ζ) + θγδω (1− ζ))Rˆt +
ωγθ (1− δ∗) (1− ζ) (1− ω)
(1− ω∗) (ζ + ω (1− ζ) + θγδω (1− ζ))
(
βEtpi
∗
H,t+1 − pi∗H,t
)
where Rˆt is specified as
Rˆt = (1 + γρδ) (1− δ) Tˆt+
(
γ + σ
ψ
)
Cˆt−γρδ∗ (1− δ∗) Tˆ ∗t −
γ (1− δ∗)
σ
qˆt− (1− ψ)σ
ψ
Cˆt−1−(γ + 1) at
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and from the resource constraint
Cˆt = Yˆt − ρδ (1− δ) Tˆt + ρ (1− δ∗) δ∗Tˆ ∗t +
(
1− δ∗
σ
)
qˆt
The supply of home produced goods in the foreign country is derived by following similar steps.
Home producers set their price in foreign country according to the following maximization rule
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ω∗β)s
C−σt+sPH,t+s
Pt+s
[{
p∗Fort (h)
P ∗H,t+s
Zt+sP
∗
H,t+s
PH,t+s
−
(
θ
θ − 1
)
Wt+s
At+sPH,t+s
}
yft+s(pt(h))
]
= 0
and its loglinear approximation is summarized as follows
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ωβ)s
pˆ∗Fort,t+s(h) + ẑht −
 Ŵt+s
At+sPH,t+s
 = 0 (62)
where zht =
ZtP ∗H,t
PH,t
. And after following similar steps as in the derivation of the supply in the home
country I conclude to the following for the supply of home goods in the foreign country
pi∗H,t =
ζ
(ζ + ω∗ (1− ζ) + θγδω∗ (1− ζ))pi
∗
H,t−1 +
(ω∗ − ω) (γθδ (1− ζ) (1− ω∗))
(1− ω) (ζ + ω∗ (1− ζ) + θγδω∗ (1− ζ))piH,t + . . .
(1− ω∗β) (1− ζ) (1− ω∗)
(ζ + ω∗ (1− ζ) + θγδω∗ (1− ζ))Rˆ
∗
t +
ω∗γθδ (1− ζ) (1− ω∗)
(1− ω) (ζ + ω∗ (1− ζ) + θγδω∗ (1− ζ)) (βEtpiH,t+1 − piH,t)
Having used ẑht = qˆt − δ∗Tˆ ∗t + (1− δ)Tˆt, Rˆ∗t is specified as
Rˆ∗t = (γρδ − 1) (1− δ) Tˆt+
(
γ + σ
ψ
)
Cˆt−δ∗(γρ(1−δ∗)−1)Tˆ ∗t −(
γ (1− δ∗)
σ
+1)qˆt−(1− ψ)σ
ψ
Cˆt−1−(γ + 1) at+s
Aggregate Demand
The market clearing condition for home goods market satisfies the following
Yt = CH,t + C∗H,t
or
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Yt =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
δCH,t +
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−ρ
(1− δ∗)C∗H,t
and after loglinearizing and solving for Cˆt , I receive the following
Cˆt = Yˆt − ρδ (1− δ) Tˆt + ρ (1− δ∗) δ∗Tˆ ∗t +
(
1− δ∗
σ
)
qˆt
Using the Euler equation accruing from the optimizing households loglinearized first order condition
(12) and the fact that CˆOt = 1ψ Cˆt − 1−ψψ Cˆt−1, I end up to the aggregate demand equation for the
home country
Yˆt = − ψ(2− ψ)σ (it − Etpit+1)+
1
2− ψEtYˆt+1+
1− ψ
2− ψYˆt−1−
ρδ (1− δ)
2− ψ EtTˆt+1+
ρδ∗ (1− δ∗)
2− ψ EtTˆ
∗
t+1+. . .
(1− δ∗)
(2− ψ)σEtqˆt+1 + ρδ (1− δ) Tˆt − ρδ
∗ (1− δ∗) Tˆ ∗t −
1− δ∗
σ
qˆt − ρδ (1− ψ) (1− δ)2− ψ Tˆt−1 + . . .
ρδ∗ (1− ψ) (1− δ∗)
2− ψ Tˆ
∗
t−1 +
(1− ψ) (1− δ∗)
(2− ψ)σ qˆt−1
and similarly for the foreign country
Yˆ ∗t = −
ψ∗
(2− ψ∗)σ
(
i∗t − Etpi∗t+1
)
+ 12− ψ∗EtYˆ
∗
t+1+
1− ψ∗
2− ψ∗ Yˆ
∗
t−1−
ρδ∗ (1− δ∗)
2− ψ∗ EtTˆ
∗
t+1+
ρδ (1− δ)
2− ψ∗ EtTˆt+1−. . .
− (1− δ)(2− ψ∗)σEtqˆt+1 + ρδ
∗ (1− δ∗) Tˆ ∗t − ρδ (1− δ) Tˆt +
1− δ
σ
qˆt − ρδ
∗ (1− ψ∗) (1− δ∗)
2− ψ∗ Tˆ
∗
t−1 + . . .
ρδ (1− ψ∗) (1− δ)
2− ψ∗ Tˆt−1 −
(1− ψ∗) (1− δ∗)
(2− ψ∗)σ qˆt−1
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Appendix C: The welfare criterion
In this section I derive the second order approximation (44) to the representative household’s
utility function (6) in the home country. The steps for the derivation of the welfare measure for
the foreign country are exactly the same. I assume that there is a subsidy to labor. This implies
that the steady state is efficient, given that the distortions form monopolistic competition are
exhausted. Therefore, I derive the welfare criterion for each country using a second-order Taylor
series expansion of (6) around the efficient steady state. Moreover, the welfare measure is expressed
as deviations from the flexible price equilibrium, which is efficient as well, given the labor subsidy.
The second order approximation of the welfare of the representative optimizing household re-
ceives the following form
Wt = U + UC(CˆOt +
1
2(1 +
UCCC
UC
)CˆOt
2
)− UL(Lˆt + 12(1 +
ULLL
UL
)Lˆ2t (63)
where UC = C−σ, UCC = C−σ−1, UL = Lγ and ULL = Lγ−1. Using the fact that yˆt(h) = at + Lˆt
and approximating it up to a second order I receive the following expression for labor
Lˆt = 1 +
y(h)
L
Et(yˆt(h)) + at +
y(h)
2L var(yˆt(h)) + a
2
t −
1
2 Lˆ
2
t (64)
Moreover by Woodford (Ch. 6) I have that
var(yˆ(i)) = δθ2var(p˜t(h)) + (1− δ)θ2var(p˜∗t (h)) (65)
But p˜t(h) and p˜t(h) are determined according to (18) in the main text. Let P¯H,t ≡ Et [log(p˜t(h))]
and ∆t ≡ var(log(p˜t(h)). Then,
∆t ≡ var(log(p˜t(h)− PH,t−1)
= Et
[
(log(p˜t(h)− PH,t−1)2 − (Et [log(p˜t(h)− PH,t−1])2
]
= ω∆t−1 + (1− ω)ζ(log(pBt (h)− P¯H,t−1)2 + (1− ω)(1− ζ)(log(pFort (h)− P¯H,t−1)2
−(P¯H,t − P¯H,t−1) (66)
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where pBt (h) and pFt (h) are the prices set by the backward and forward looking firms respectively.
The same expression holds for p˜∗t (h). Before substituting the above expression in (62) and then in
(61), note that P¯H,t = log(P¯H,t) + O(||ξ||2), so that P¯H,t − P¯H,t−1 = piH,t + O(||ξ||2). Additionally,
the following relationships hold
p˜t(h) = ζpBt (h) + (1− ζ) pFort (h)
p˜t(h) =
ω
1− ωpiH,t + PH,t
Using the above expressions for p˜t(h) I end up to the following expression for the price that is set
by the forward looking firms
pˆFort (h)− PH,t−1 =
1
(1− ω)(1− ζ)piH,t −
ζ
(1− ω)(1− ζ)piH,t−1
Substituting the above expression into (64), I receive the following for ∆t
∞∑
t=0
βt∆t =
1
(1− ωβ)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ω
1− ωpi
2
H,t +
1− ζ
ζ(1− ω) (piH,t − piH,t−1)
2
]
+ t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (67)
Similarly for the price set in the foreign country for the home good I receive the following
∞∑
t=0
βt∆∗t =
1
(1− ω∗β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ω∗
1− ω∗pi
∗2
H,t +
1− ζ
ζ(1− ω∗)
(
pi∗H,t − pi∗H,t−1
)2]
+ t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (68)
where t.i.p. represents terms independent of policy and O(||ξ||3) stands for terms of order higher
than two.
Additionally, note that for the home output the following relationship holds (and similarly for
foreign output)
Yˆt = Et(yˆt(h)) +
1
2
(
θ − 1
θ
)
var(yˆt(h)) +O(||ξ||3)
Using the above expression to substitute for Et(yˆt(i)) in equation (2), I receive the following
expression for Lˆt
Lˆt ≈ 1 +
Y
L
Yˆt − 12θ
Y
L
var(yˆt(h))− 12 Lˆ
2
t + t.i.p. (69)
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Finally, a second order approximation of the resource constraint of the model yields the following
Cˆt ≈
1
2 Yˆt +
1
4 Yˆ
2
t +
1
2 Yˆ
∗
t +
1
4 Yˆ
∗2
t +
1
2σ qˆt +
1
4σ2 qˆ
2
t −
1
2σ qˆtCˆt (70)
Recalling that
Ct = ψCOt + (1− ψ)CRt
and
CRt = Ct−1
so that
CˆOt =
1
ψ
Cˆt − 1− ψ
ψ
Cˆt−1 (71)
Substituting, (69) into (61), I receive the following form for welfare
Wt = U + UC(
1
ψ
Cˆt − 1− ψ
ψ
Cˆt−1 +
1
2(1 +
UCCC
UC
)( 1
ψ
Cˆ2t +
1− ψ
ψ
Cˆ2t−1 +
1− ψ
ψ2
CˆtCˆt−1))
−UL(Lˆt + 12(1 +
ULLL
UL
)Lˆ2t + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (72)
Substituting (67), (68), (69) and (70) into (72), I receive the following form for the welfare measure
Wt = −12ucCΞ{λ1(Yˆt − ynt )2 + λ2(Yˆ ∗t − y∗nt )2 + λ3(qˆt − qnt )2 + λ4∆qˆ2t + λ5∆Yˆ ∗t 2 + λ6∆Yˆt2 + . . .
+pi2H,t+λ7(piH,t−piH,t−1)2+λ8(pi∗H,t)2+λ9(pi∗H,t−pi∗H,t−1)2+λ10(qˆt+ Yˆt)2+λ11(qˆt+ Yˆ ∗t )2+λ12(qˆt−1+
Yˆt)2 +λ13(qˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 . . .λ12(qˆt−1 + Yˆt)2 +λ13(qˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 +λ14(Yˆ ∗t−1−y∗nt−1)(qˆt−1− qnt−1)+λ15(yt−1−
ynt−1)(y∗t−1 − y∗nt−1) + λ16(Cˆt − cnt )(qˆt − qnt )+
+λ17(Yˆt + Yˆ ∗t−1)2 + λ18(Yˆt−1 + Yˆ ∗t )2 + λ19(Yˆt−1 − ynt−1)(qt−1 − qnt−1) + λ20(Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ ∗nt )(Yˆ ∗t−1 − Yˆ ∗nt−1) +
λ21(Yˆ ∗t−1 + qˆt)2 + λ22(Yˆt−1 + qˆt)2+λ23(Yˆt−1 − ynt−1)(qˆt−1 − qnt−1) + λ24(Cˆ∗t−1 − c∗nt−1)(qˆt−1 − qnt−1) +
λ25(qˆt − qnt )(qˆt−1 − qnt−1) + λ26(Yˆt−1 − ynt−1)(Yˆt − ynt ) + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
where
Ξ = (θω)(σ/(−1 + σ))−ρC−σ(1−ρ)Lγ(1+ρ))/(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
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λ1 = Ξ(((3(−1 + σ − 2ψ) + 16(C − 1))(Lγ + 1))γ(ψ2))/(16(ψ))) + ((3 + 3σ(−1 + ψ)− ψ)(−1 + ψ)/(16(ψ2)))−
−(σ − 1)(1− ψ)/(2σ(ψ2))− (1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2)−−(1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2))
λ2 = −Ξ((3(1− σ + 2ψ)/(16(ψ2)))− ((3 + 3σ(−1 + ψ)− ψ)(1− ψ)/(16ψ2))− (1− ψ) ∗ (−2 + 2σ + ψ)/(8σ(ψ2))−
−(1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2)− (1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4σψ2)−−(1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2))
λ3 = Ξ(((5−5σ+2ψ)/(16((σψ)2)))+(−1+σ)(1−ψ)/(2σψ2)+(1−ψ)(−2+2σ+ψ)/(8σψ2)+(1−ψ)∗(−1+σ)/(4σψ2))
λ4 = −Ξ(−((σ − 1)(1 − ψ)/(2σψ2)) + ((−1 + ψ)(5 + 15ψ + σ(−5 + 13ψ))/(16(σψ)2)) − (1 − ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4σψ2))
λ5 = −Ξ((3 + 3σ(−1 + ψ)− ψ) ∗ (1− ψ)/(16ψ2)− (1− ψ)(−2 + 2σ + ψ)/(8σψ2)− (1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2))
λ6 = −Ξ(((3 + 3σ(−1 + ψ) − ψ)(−1 + ψ)/(16(ψ2))) − ((−1 + σ)(1 − ψ)/(4σ(ψ2))) − (1 − ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2))
λ7 = υζ/(ω(1 − ζ)),λ8 = υω∗(1 − ω)(1 − ωβ)/(ω(1 − ω∗)(1 − ω∗β)), λ9 = υζ(1 − ω)(1 − ωβ)/(ω(1 − ω∗)(1 −
ζ)(1− ω∗β)) λ10 = −Ξ(−1 + σ + 2ψ)/(8σψ2), λ11 = −Ξ(−1 + σ + 2ψ)/(8σψ2), λ12 = −Ξ((σ − 1)(1− ψ)/(2σψ2))
λ13 = −Ξ(1 − ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4σψ2) λ14 = −Ξ(−1 + ψ)(1 − ψ + σ(−1 + 5ψ))/(8σψ2), λ15 = Ξ(1 + σ(−1 + ψ) −
3ψ)(−1 + ψ)/(8(ψ2)) λ16 = −Ξ(−1 + σ)/(2σψ2) λ17 = −Ξ(−1 + σ)(1 − ψ)/(4ψ2), λ18 = −Ξ(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2),
λ19 = −Ξ(−1 + ψ)(1− 3ψ + σ(−1 + 5ψ))/(8σψ2)
λ20 = −Ξ(((−1 + σ)(1− ψ)/(4ψ2)) + ((3 + 3σ(−1 + ψ)− ψ)(1− ψ)/(8ψ2))− (1− ψ)(−2 + 2σ + ψ)/(8σψ2) + (1−
ψ)(−1 + σ)/(2ψ2)) λ21 = −Ξ(1− ψ)(−2 + 2σ + ψ)/(8σψ2), λ22 = Ξ(1− ψ)(−1 + σ)/(4ψ2)
λ23 = −Ξ(−1 + ψ)(1− 3ψ + σ(−1 + 5ψ))/(8σψ2), λ24 = Ξ(−1 + σ)((−1 + ψ)2)/(2σψ2) λ25 = −Ξ(((−1 + σ)(1−
ψ)/(4(σψ)2))−((σ−1)(1−ψ)/(σψ2))+((−1+ψ)(5+15ψ+σ(−5+13ψ))/(8(σψ)2))−(1−ψ)(−1+σ)/(4σψ2)) λ26 =
−Ξ(((−1+σ)(1−ψ)/(2ψ2))+((3+3σ(−1+ψ)−ψ)(−1+ψ)/(8ψ2))−((−1+σ)(1−ψ)/(4σψ2))+(1−ψ)(−1+σ)/(2ψ2))
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